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Abstract 
 
This thesis employs Carl von Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces to 
conduct an analysis of World War II’s 1944-1945 Ardennes Offensive. The 
literature largely focuses on presenting the physical components of the 
offensive, neglecting the moral. This thesis aims to fill this gap by 
presenting an analysis of the utilisation and effects of both physical and 
moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive and determining the importance of 
each to the outcome. Analysing the planning and execution of the offensive 
through this theoretical perspective reveals that moral forces played a 
significant part in Allied success in the Ardennes. The analysis exposed the 
German reliance on physical superiority yet failure to adjust initial plans to 
the geographical conditions in the area, in part due to Adolf Hitler’s total 
control of the armed forces. Following the offensive’s commencement, 
Allied military leadership demonstrated intuitive thought, good judgment, 
and determination resulting in swift defense of the area. German Forces 
were unable to break through this defense despite their great physical 
advantage. The analysis suggests that Allied moral forces greatly 
contributed to this initial defense, utilising psychological strength until the 
physical forces were able to be brought up to equal strength. As a re-
interpretation of the Ardennes Offensive, this thesis contributes to the 
historical studies on battles of World War II and demonstrates the 
importance of moral forces in warfare.  
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Introduction 
The Ardennes Offensive, more commonly known as ‘The Battle of the 
Bulge’ was the last major German offensive of World War II and took place 
in the Ardennes region of Belgium, Luxembourg, and France between 16 
December, 1944 and January 25, 1945. On December 16, German Forces 
totalling approximately 250,000 began the attack against a mere 68,822 
United States Forces who were resting and refitting in the region (Cole, 
1965). There were multiple objectives to the offensive; firstly, the key 
objective was to capture the port of Antwerp, north of the Ardennes, which 
was currently occupied by the Allies (Whiting, 1985, p. 23). Secondly, in 
doing so, the Germany Army was to split the British Forces in the north 
from United States Forces in the south and create disruption within the 
Allied High Command (Cole, 1965, p. 17). Lastly, it was expected that the 
culmination of these objectives would force the Western Allies to sign a 
separate peace treaty from the Soviets which would allow Germany to focus 
solely on the war in the east (Cirillo, 2003, p. 5; Cooke & Evans, 2008, p. 9; 
Ethier, 2009, p. 38; Whiting, 1985, p. 22). By this stage of the war, the 
physical components were not the only determining factor of successful 
offensive and defensive actions, the psychological strength of an army’s 
troops pushed them farther than imaginable. 
This thesis will employ Carl von Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces, 
as outlined in his text On War (1993), originally published in 1832, in its 
analysis of the Ardennes Offensive. Clausewitz’s perspective states that it is 
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the interaction between physical and moral forces that determines the victor 
in warfare (Clausewitz cited in Howard, 2002, p. 27). Physical forces are 
those that are more commonly linked to warfare and include the armed 
forces, their composition and armament (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 157). A study 
of the literature reveals that most examinations of the offensive focus purely 
on the physical forces, yet Clausewitz’s perspective perceives this as 
incomplete as all warfare involves psychological forces. These 
psychological forces Clausewitz terms ‘moral forces’ and include courage, 
morale, and the skill of the commander (Clausewitz, p. 96, 221; Howard, 
2002, p. 25; Wallach, 1986, p. 5). This thesis will employ the perspective 
that physical and moral forces intertwine to produce the final result, 
therefore an army is more likely to be the victor in warfare if they marshal 
both physical and moral forces. 
The aim of the research is to analyse how Allied and German Forces 
utilised their physical and moral forces and to determine the effects in doing 
so. The physical forces will form the foundation due to their measurability 
which will be followed by a deeper analysis of the moral forces. This will 
include analysing the individual and group sources of the adversaries moral 
forces as these effect the output of both forces as “war is a trial of moral and 
physical forces by means of the latter” (Clausewitz cited in Howard, 2002, 
p. 27). The Ardennes Offensive is an ideal battle to analyse through this 
perspective as the German Army held a vast physical superiority in the 
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offensive’s initial stage, yet failed to capitalise on this advantage to produce 
success. 
As the last major German offensive of the war, and the United States 
largest land battle of World War II, the Ardennes Offensive is frequently 
examined in the literature (Cole, 1965; Forty, 2000; Goolrick & Tanner, 
1979; MacDonald, 1993). Despite this, historians continue to focus 
primarily on physical aspects, suggesting that physical forces were the 
single influence on the final result (Blanchette, 1998; Cole, 1965; Dupuy et 
al., 1994; Forty, 2000). While many authors briefly mention moral forces 
(Ambrose, 2001; Blumenson, 1985), the failure to provide a deeper analysis 
reveals that there is no comprehensive study of the offensive which then 
limits our understanding of the offensive, and consequently warfare itself, to 
a battle defined solely by physical aspects. This gap within the literature can 
be filled by an analysis employing Clausewitz’s perspective on moral forces 
that has not previously been applied to the Ardennes Offensive. In doing so, 
this thesis aims to answer the following research questions: 
1. Using Clausewitzian theory, what does an analysis of World War 
II’s 1944-1945 Ardennes Offensive reveal about the utilisation and 
effects of physical and moral forces? 
2. To what degree was the Ardennes Offensive determined through 
physical or moral forces? 
3. What were the main events, operations or situations that effected 
moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive? 
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This thesis employs historiography to conduct the historical analysis 
and provide a re-interpretation of the Ardennes Offensive. Historiography is 
the most appropriate methodology as it allows for the discovery of the 
various interpretations of the offensive through the study of primary and 
secondary sources, most notably official histories, memoirs and interviews 
(Berg, 2001; Lundy, 2008). By analysing the various interpretations 
presented in the literature, this thesis will produce a re-interpretation of the 
Ardennes Offensive through the perspective of Clausewitzian theory by 
applying a connection between the theoretical concepts outlined by 
Clausewitz to the offensive to provide an explanation for Allied success in 
the Ardennes. 
This thesis is structured according to subjects to allow for a clear and 
organised analysis. Beginning with Chapter One, the thesis will outline the 
theoretical perspective, review the literature and describe the methodology. 
Chapter Two examines the events and decisions leading up to the Ardennes 
Offensive to provide perspective on its significance to both Germany and 
the Allies. This chapter will also provide background to the planning of the 
offensive whilst introducing the German and Allied leaders involved. 
Chapter Three begins the analysis of the physical forces to establish how the 
adversaries utilised these forces and conclude the effectiveness of the 
manner in which they were employed according to Clausewitz’s theory. 
Chapter Four explores the moral forces involved; this analysis progresses 
from the discussion of physical forces in Chapter Three and explores further 
by focusing on specific events occurring within the offensive, notably the 
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Siege of Bastogne. Lastly, Chapter Five investigates military leadership in 
the Ardennes, discussing the influence of both German and Allied leaders 
on the utilisation of physical and moral forces and the result of decisions 
and actions made throughout the planning and execution on Allied success 
and German failure. The analysis of physical and moral forces in the 
Ardennes Offensive offers a unique perspective that contributes to the study 
of the psychological and emotional influence on warfare. 
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Chapter One 
Theory 
Carl von Clausewitz (1780 – 1831) is a well-known military theorist 
whose text, On War (1993), originally published in 1832, is considered by 
many historians to be the most significant text on warfare (Louise Wilmott 
cited in Clausewitz, 1997, p. ix). Clausewitz’s theory of warfare 
encompasses almost all aspects relating to the operation, ranging from the 
relationship between attack and defense, political and military objectives, 
and the tactics of combat. On War, and its precursor, Principles of War 
(2003), originally published in 1832, were developed during his experiences 
in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars; it was through these experiences 
that Clausewitz became observant to the human dimension of warfare 
(Howard, 2002, p. 5). This human dimension, or emotionally based element, 
became what is known as ‘moral forces’ - forces that are unquantifiable for 
instance courage and morale, but have a great effect on the execution of war 
on all levels. Clausewitz’s perspective is that moral forces are just as 
important as ‘physical forces’ - forces that are more commonly associated 
with warfare as they include weapons, equipment, and troop numbers 
(Handel M. I., 2001, pp. 83, 106; Kleemeier, 2007). It is through this 
theoretical perspective in which the analysis of World War II’s Ardennes 
Offensive will take place. 
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Clausewitz’s (1993; 2003) notion of physical forces consists of three 
elements: the size of the armed forces, their composition and their armament 
(1993, p. 157). Unlike moral forces, physical forces have the ability to be 
quantified and thus make it easier to determine a connection to the outcome 
of an offensive. Clausewitz’s principles on the application of physical forces 
include utilising a maximum use of force by employing surprise and speed, 
and having superiority in terms of numbers. Clausewitz states that with 
physical forces being equal between opponents the determining factor in 
war would be the moral forces (Howard, 2002, p. 30). Thus, it is the 
interaction between physical and moral forces that determine the victor as 
“war is a trial of moral and physical forces by means of the latter” 
(Clausewitz cited in Howard, 2002, p. 27). Michael Handel author of the 
classic text, Masters of War (2001), expresses Clausewitz’s perspective of 
the relationship between the forces in his article, Who Is Afraid Of Carl von 
Clausewitz. A Guide To The Perplexed (1997): 
In addition to mobilizing and using all possible 
physical/material force, the opponents simultaneously marshall 
all of the moral and spiritual forces available (e.g., motivation, 
dedication, and spirit of sacrifice). When one side has reached 
the limits of its material strength, it can always add to its 
military efforts by mobilizing all possible moral strength. Moral 
forces thus act as a force multiplier… (p. 7) 
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The Ardennes Offensive is an ideal battle to analyse due to the large 
physical superiority initially held by the German Army. 
 Moral forces are those that underline all aspects of war and are 
endless; those that Clausewitz discusses include courage, morale, and the 
skill of the commander. According to Clausewitz, everything in war is 
uncertain due to the influence of these moral forces; thus “all military action 
is intertwined with psychological forces and effects” (Clausewitz cited in 
Howard, 2002, p. 25). It is this notion that has formed the lens through 
which the analysis of the Ardennes Offensive has taken place to reveal how 
moral forces were utilised and the effects of this; which is then used to 
determine the influence on the troops and consequently their utilisation of 
physical forces. It is important to note the weakness of the theory which lies 
in the inability to provide quantifiable standards by which to measure moral 
forces; regardless the utilisation and effects can be discussed in detail. The 
three forces that will be analysed are courage, morale and military 
leadership. Courage: “the highest of all moral qualities in times of danger” 
(Clausewitz, 1993, p. 96), assists troops in fighting through constant danger 
and fear and is a result of either habit or positive motivations (p. 97, 158). 
Morale is the spirit or mood of the individual soldier or the mass; high 
morale is a result of frequent success or the use of maximum effort but will 
also depend on why each soldier fought (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 221; Wallach, 
1986, p. 5). It is a commander’s responsibility to understand the morale of 
his troops which leads into the final factor of military leadership. The ideal 
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military leader has a number of balanced characteristics, that of skilled 
judgement, a sense of intuition, courage, and determination (Clausewitz, 
1993, p. 96). The assessment on the quality of these forces will occur by 
evidence of the General’s adaptability according to actual conditions, 
displays of fortitude in the face of danger, understanding of their troops 
moral forces, and by evidence of following their intuitive thoughts. 
Evidently, moral forces often intertwine and affect not only each other, but 
also the utilisation of physical forces. Therefore, an army has a greater 
chance of success if they mobilise both physical and moral strength. 
Literature Review 
Clausewitzian Theory 
 
Carl von Clausewitz’s theory deviates from the theoretical writings of 
nineteenth century military theorists due, not merely to his argument on the 
importance of moral forces, but to the simple fact that he includes these 
forces in his argument at all. The literature notices this omission, yet it 
continues to be unknown as to why his contemporaries, including Antoine-
Henri Jomini, known for his work The Art of War (2006), fail to mention 
this human or emotional element. Gat (2001, p. 125) and Martel (2011) 
believe military theorists omit moral forces due to a dismissal as irrelevant 
or an inability to quantify these forces unlike physical forces. Michael 
Handel’s text, Masters of War (2001), is considered a classic text on the 
study of military theory and his examination of various military theories 
concludes that this gap is due to the explanations mentioned by Gat and 
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Martel, however he adds that physical forces are the most recognised 
element of warfare, thus naturally they become the focus of developing 
theories (p. 82). Clausewitz himself expected this, writing before his death 
that as moral forces are unquantifiable they are often dismissed (1993, p. 
216). He goes on to state that any theory that disregards this element is 
incomplete as all “warfare has psychological effects” (p. 217). 
Just as military theorists tend to ignore moral forces in warfare, so 
does the literature examining Clausewitz’s theory ignore, or note very 
briefly, his argument on moral forces as detailed in On War (1993) and 
Principles of War (2003). Clausewitz’s well known statement that “war is a 
mere continuation of policy by other means” largely dominates the focus of 
the literature (Paret, 1992; Roxborough, 1994; Waldman, 2010). However, 
the examination of moral forces has developed in recent years with authors 
such as Drohan (2006), Gibbs (1975) and Kleemeier (2007) publishing 
works which examine moral forces in detail. The development of literature 
on Clausewitz’s theory of moral forces appears to coincide with the public’s 
recent interest in the psychological effects of warfare and thus could 
potentially begin the academic body of work on the concept. 
Ulrike Kleemeier’s, “Moral Forces in War” (2007) is among the 
leading contributions on moral forces in the literature as he expands on the 
discussion as outlined by Clausewitz in On War (1993). Kleemeier provides 
an extension to the work by breaking down the individual elements of moral 
forces and is the most comprehensive study found within the literature. 
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However, he sees one major weakness to Clausewitz’s framework of moral 
forces, that of obedience. Kleemeier challenges Clausewitz’s perception of a 
soldier being largely independent as he states that this can create chaos and 
issues with leadership (p. 119). Adding obedience to the arrangement of 
forces, he asserts, will assist in combatting these issues. Brian Drohan 
(2006) completes a similar discussion in his work, Carl von Clausewitz, His 
Trinity, and the 1812 Russian Campaign, however his discussion appears to 
simply reiterate Clausewitz’s writings due to a similar but slightly different 
military direction than that of moral forces. Even so, Drohan’s work 
provides the connection of moral forces to additional elements of 
Clausewitz’s overarching theory. Baldwin’s (1981) work is similar, whilst 
not applying moral forces specifically, he discusses the influence of 
Clausewitz on Nazi Germany. Where the literature lacks further insight is 
through application of the theory of moral forces to actual warfare. This 
thesis attempts to fill this gap by analysing a modern offensive through a 
nineteenth century military theory to provide a re-interpretation of the event. 
Similar to Kleemeier (2007), Clausewitz scholar, Peter Paret (1985; 
1992) perceives limitations to Clausewitz’s approach. Paret believes 
Clausewitz’s approach in employing men like Napoleon as examples to his 
theory are unsatisfactory for practical application as he states the average 
soldier will not meet these standards (1992, p. 113). Nonetheless, this 
alleged ‘one-sidedness’ does not diminish the importance of moral forces as 
a whole. Jehuda L. Wallach (1986) approaches the theory in a different 
manner, stating the theory was never meant to be set rules but a guide. This 
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stance is more accurate as all soldiers have psychological differences and 
this is acknowledged by Clausewitz. Thus, no matter the example he utilised 
in his writings, the application would differ, making Paret’s argument 
irrelevant. Clausewitz utilised Napoleon as an example as he was involved 
in the Napoleonic War and was privy to these experiences and information 
that a study of historical warfare could not provide. Wallach believes that 
the knowledge presented by Clausewitz is beneficial as it stresses the need 
for commander’s to understand the importance of moral forces in warfare 
(p. 5). In The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation (1986), Wallach very 
briefly discusses Clausewitz’s theory in relation to World War II and on the 
Ardennes Offensive in Chapter 19 of Book Three (p. 296-300). However, 
there remains no analysis of both the physical and moral forces in the 
Ardennes Offensive. 
The Ardennes Offensive 
The Ardennes Offensive was the largest land battle fought by United 
States Forces in World War II involving over half a million troops. 
Consequently it is heavily examined in the literature (Blanchette, 1998; 
Cole, 1965; MacDonald, 1984; Toland, 1999). These examinations began 
immediately following the offensive’s conclusion to the present day. The 
Ardennes Offensive commenced with very different physical forces in terms 
of size, composition and armament (Cole, 1965). Given this disproportion of 
physical forces, it is surprising that the state of moral forces has been 
neglected in the literature. Instead, the majority of the literature has focused 
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on providing a detailed examination of the offensive, with no theoretical 
foundation for analysis. A re-interpretation of the offensive employing 
Clausewitz’s theory of moral forces may fill the gap in our understanding of 
the offensive’s outcome and provide an alternative explanation for Allied 
success in the Ardennes. 
Hugh M. Cole’s, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge (1965), was 
published in 1965 as one part of the U.S. Army’s official history of World 
War II. This text is considered by scholars as the most significant work on 
the Ardennes Offensive and is often used as the foundation for further 
research (Blanchette, 1998; Dupuy, Bongard, & Anderson Jr., 1994). Each 
author’s extensive research supports the accuracy of Cole’s study, proving 
the methodology and production of results as appropriate. The literature on 
the physical forces in the Ardennes is vast, providing detailed information to 
be analysed. In contrast, information on moral forces in the literature is 
mentioned, yet most fail to investigate further. 
Hal C. Pattison (cited in Cole, 1993, p. vii) states that before the 
offensive began the American soldier was “buoyed with success” with 
Whiting (1985, pp. 4, 33) adding that they were ‘relaxed’ and ‘tolerant’ with 
commanders confident as most were expecting the war to be over by 
Christmas. Historians including Forty (2000) connect this state of morale to 
the almost constant victory in offensive movements since the United States 
Army had landed on the continent (p. 83). Consequently, the Ardennes 
region of Belgium, Luxembourg, and France was a resting and refitting 
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ground for U.S. troops (Blanchette, 1998). Whiting describes the Ardennes 
in September, 1944: 
...the Ghost Front [Ardennes region] had settled into a kind of 
limbo, a haven of peace in the midst of war. Here the artillery 
fired mainly for the sake of registration, and patrols probed the 
enemy lines on the other side of the twin rivers only to keep in 
practice. (1985, p. 39) 
The presentation of the United States contentment can be compared to the 
presentation of the Germany Army’s passion once news of the offensive 
became known (Cole, 1965). While Whiting (1985, p. 4, 33) believes U.S. 
troops were relaxed, Forty disagrees (2000, 30-31). This appears similar 
with the Germans, Whiting stating they were nervous and tense (p. 88) and 
Forty believing they were still determined (p. 30). MacDonald (1984) 
continues this assessment stating that the SS Panzer Divisions had morale 
highest of all (p. 90). Ambrose’s (2002, p. 383) opinion differs, stating that 
the average soldier did not understand the offensive in the west at all which 
Whiting agrees as he states threats were used to produce effort (p. 56, 57). 
By connecting the various presentations within the literature on the state of 
moral forces between the adversaries to Clausewitzian theory it may provide 
a theoretical explanation for the offensive’s final result. As well as broad 
remarks on moral forces within the Allied and German Armies in their 
entirety, some authors, including Robert S. Rush (1999) and Stephen 
Ambrose (2001), have narrowed their focus. 
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 Robert S. Rush’s 1999 journal article, “A Different Perspective: 
Cohesion, Morale and Operational Effectiveness in the German Army, Fall 
1944” provides an interesting explanation for Whiting’s (1985) presentation 
of the German Army’s passion. Although Rush studies an individual Corps 
not directly involved in the offensive, the study provides useful information 
on the state of moral forces in 1944. Rush is one of many authors who state 
that the majority of German soldiers were continuing to fight even though 
they did not believe they would ultimately succeed (p. 497). The discussion 
then turns to the abuse of tactics, including threats of death, to produce the 
moral forces needed for soldiers to fight intensely which provides 
explanation for their continued effort. A collection of interviews with the 
senior German generals involved in the Ardennes Offensive including Gerd 
von Rundstedt, Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, and Hasso von Manteuffel, is 
assembled in Danny S. Parker’s text, Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The 
German View of the Battle of the Bulge (1997). Parker observes the lack of 
belief amongst the generals as to the possibility of success which aligns with 
Rush’s observation of German soldiers lacking the belief in success in the 
overall war. Kleemeier’s (2007) study of moral forces, in particular his 
addition of obedience, provides an interesting link to the typical German 
soldier’s disbelief in success but continued fighting in combat. The gap in 
the literature then lies in whether the belief or disbelief in success, and how 
moral forces were produced, effected the actions of the troops and produced 
greater force. 
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 Rush (1999) also provides another layer to the development of moral 
forces, stating that newly formed units are unlikely to have as high a state of 
morale as those that have served with one another for a longer period of 
time (p. 479). As the German Army had recently altered the drafting age to 
increase the amount of divisions available for the offensive, nearly one 
million soldiers were added to the Army (Blanchette, 1998, p. 17). Stephen 
Ambrose in his text, Band of Brothers (2001), follows one U.S. Company 
from their first days of combat training to the end of World War II, 
including their involvement in the Ardennes. These texts are invaluable, 
whereas Whiting (1985) and Forty (2000) provide overall depictions of the 
Ardennes and moral forces, Ambrose and Rush provide a more narrowed 
examination. The literature also accounts for specific events and situations 
within the Ardennes such as Weingartner’s (1979) focus on the Malmédy 
Massacre, an event that shook Allied morale, and Marshall’s (1988) focus 
on the Siege of Bastogne. 
The literature surrounding Allied and German leadership in the 
Ardennes Offensive is led by J. D. Morelock’s book, Generals of the 
Ardennes: American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge, (1994). 
Morelock focuses on six generals involved in the Ardennes from the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, General Dwight. D. Eisenhower 
through to Division level. Danny S. Parker’s collection of interviews and 
essays in his text, Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The German View of the 
Battle of the Bulge (1997) is similar; however this collection provides first-
hand accounts with the main German generals involved. Both Morelock and 
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Parker’s texts provide valuable details that can be analysed and linked for 
comparison purposes. An analysis of the literature on Allied and German 
leadership will provide the information necessary to discuss the use of 
leadership in the planning and execution of the offensive and the effects of 
this leadership throughout. 
Primary source documents are essential for the analysis to occur, 
providing unpolluted accounts of the events. Collections of letters, diary 
entries and various documents by Allied forces can be accessed through the 
Eisenhower Library. The study of memoirs written following the war, such 
as Eisenhower’s Crusade in Europe (1997), Patton & Harkin’s War as I 
Knew It (1995), and Bradley’s A Soldier’s Story (1975) occur through a 
critical eye due to natural or intended bias. However, the memoirs will be 
supported by biographical works which provide detailed examination of the 
situation and individuals (Ambrose, 1990; Blumenson, 1985). Cole (1965, 
p. 17) Dupuy, et al. (1994, p. 10), and MacDonald (1984, p. 22) agree that a 
common objective of the offensive was to cause chaos in Allied leadership. 
By analysing the decisions, actions and movements of Allied and German 
generals at the three major levels of leadership presented in the literature a 
conclusion can be made as to the effectiveness of the utilisation of 
leadership in the Ardennes.  
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Methodology 
 
 This thesis employs historiography as a methodology in its 
production. Historiography, or historical research, is the most appropriate 
methodology for this analysis as it allows for the different presentations and 
interpretations of the offensive to be revealed and allows for an in-depth 
study due to the vast amount of information able to be obtained, analysed 
and interpreted (Berg, 2001, p. 210-211). By analysing the presentation of 
statistical data and varying interpretations of the Ardennes Offensive, 
historiography will allow this thesis to provide an explanation as to the 
utilisation and effects of physical and moral forces and their effect on the 
outcome. 
 As historiography employs analysis and interpretation of sources it is 
reliant on both primary and secondary sources (Berg, 2001). This thesis will 
draw its research and evidence from both sources through document 
analysis (Lundy, 2008). Primary sources will be primarily from official 
histories, memoirs and interviews. The official histories will ensure the 
evidence used to support the thesis’ argument is accurate and verifiable, but 
will still require a critical eye to catch subjectivity (Andrews, 2008, para. 2). 
Secondary sources are also important as they provide analyses and 
interpretation of a variety of sources, particularly sources that are unable to 
be collected due to research restrictions or limitations. Secondary sources 
also often provide the main arguments on the topic following a thorough 
examination and can provide quantitative data essential for an analysis of a 
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military offensive as this data becomes the constant in which the analysis is 
formed around. The limitations as to this methodology are that the analysis 
is limited to research previously conducted and literature that is available to 
the public. 
 Historiography as a methodology and historical research and 
document analysis as methods allows for a relationship to form between the 
theoretical ideas of Carl von Clausewitz and the Ardennes Offensive 
(Edwards, 2000, pp. 7-11). Following this, the information obtained can 
provide evidence to support the argument that moral forces had a large 
effect on the execution and outcome of the Ardennes Offensive which has 
previously not been interpreted in such a manner. In doing so, this thesis 
will answer the following research questions: 
1. Using Clausewitzian theory, what does an analysis of World War 
II’s 1944-1945 Ardennes Offensive reveal about the utilisation and 
effects of physical and moral forces? 
2. To what degree was the Ardennes Offensive determined through 
physical or moral forces? 
3. What were the main events, operations or situations that effected 
moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive? 
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Chapter Two 
Leading Up to the Ardennes 
 
This chapter details the events and decisions leading up to the 
Ardennes Offensive, beginning from the outbreak of World War II. This 
will explain the significance of the offensive to both Germany and the Allies 
and the importance of having the port of Antwerp in their possession. 
On September 1, 1939 the world was once again plunged into war 
(Evans, 2008a; Taylor, 1975). Germany’s invasion of Poland, under the 
direction of the Führer of Germany, Adolf Hitler, was quickly followed by a 
formal declaration of war by both Britain and France, whilst the United 
States, who was not directly threatened due to their remoteness, refused to 
intervene in what they considered European affairs (Kimball, 2004, p. 86). 
All nations viewed the second war of the century with its predecessor in 
mind, thus contributing to their conflicting stances at its outbreak 
(Mawdsley, 2009). German Forces and their allies quickly overran nations 
to provide the nation’s supposed great need for lebensraum (living space), 
this resulted in mass German support for the war effort (Michel, 1973, pp. 
xv-xvi). Hitler and the Nazi regime had a number of war goals: conquer 
Europe for living space for the Third Reich, reverse the damage caused by 
the Treaty of Versailles of World War I, and exterminate races he deemed 
responsible or despised (Evans, 2008a). 
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The fall of France on June 22, 1940 was both unexpected and a 
debilitating blow to the Allies. Germany, however, was soon to be at the 
height of their eventual six year war. Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet 
Union in June 1941 began the start of Germany’s downfall. Against the 
advice of his senior generals and turning against the non-aggression pact 
between Germany and the Soviet Union, Hitler ordered for a full-scale 
attack on the Soviets named Operation Barbarossa (Mawdsley, 2009; 
Michel, 1973, p. 9). World War II scholars almost unanimously agree that 
Operation Barbarossa was a gamble that German Forces were not prepared 
for logistically or operationally (Mawdsley, 2009; Taylor, 1975). A year 
after Operation Barbarossa began it was evident that the German Army was 
running out of resources, they were simply unable to match the speed in 
which the Allies were able to produce and dispatch equipment (Taylor, 
1975, p. 32). While the invasion of the Soviet Union was always a major 
war aim, it was also necessary to gain the resources needed to continue the 
war. 
Whilst still not directly involved, the United States became according 
to Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower (1997), the “arsenal of democracy” (p. 1) in their fight against 
Nazism and their principles, ranging from totalitarianism to expansionism. 
The United States became an essential part of the Allied Powers with their 
program titled ‘lend-lease’ providing material, equipment and supplies to 
the Allied nations to assist in the fight against the Nazis (Lovelace, 2014, p. 
593). It was not until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 
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that the United States was forced to declare war on the aggressor. Germany, 
after signing the Tripartite Pact with Japan, was then forced to declare war 
on the United States. The war had officially become a world war fought in 
the air, sea, and on the land with all the Great Powers involved (Michel, 
1973, p. 120; Taylor, 1975, p. 81, 127). 
 
The Western Allies - United States, Britain and France, prepared for a 
number of years to begin an invasion of Europe and defeat Nazi Germany, 
to coincide with operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. On June 
6, 1944, the invasion began in Normandy, France. The next few months 
were debilitating for German forces, as they began losing huge numbers of 
territory, men and equipment as the Allies swept through France and 
Belgium towards Germany. In doing so, the port of Antwerp, located north 
of the Ardennes region of Belgium, was lost to Allied forces (Cole, 1965; 
MacDonald, 1984). This port had significance to both the Allies and 
Germans. In Allied hands, their logistical situation would be partially 
solved; the supplies needed in their pursuit to destroy Nazi Germany would 
arrive from Britain in Antwerp, shortening supply lines. The assistance of 
Antwerp’s port would only speed up German demise. Thus, it was in 
Germany’s best interest to do what was necessary to keep Antwerp out of 
Allied hands as it was only a matter of time before they, as well as Soviet 
forces from the East, pushed into Berlin (Evans, 2008, p. 657). Whilst Stalin 
was able to operate the Soviet war against Nazi Germany in his separate 
theatre of war, Britain and the United States were required to collaborate 
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with one another. Whilst necessary, it was not easy (Weinberg, 1994, p. 
722). 
The motivation of the Allied nations to fight against Nazism can be 
summed up by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s reflections in his post-war book, Crusade in 
Europe (1997): “We could not afford to sit still doing nothing” (p. 340). 
Nazi Germany had almost total power and control over their occupied 
territories, submitting these nations to their rules and ideological standings, 
exterminating millions of people that they blamed for Germany’s demise in 
World War I, including the Jews and Communists, and ruining economies 
and industries to support the war effort. By 1944, Germany had lost most of 
its allies; Romania, Bulgaria and Finland had deserted Germany, the Allies 
were fighting firmly in Italy, and nations were now beginning to 
increasingly refuse Germany the resources they relied on (Michel, 1973, p. 
55; Taylor, 1975, p. 124). Not only was the military situation declining, the 
morale of both the troops and population followed (Evans, 2008b, p. 468). 
With the Allies closing in on from both east and west, Hitler’s ‘no 
withdrawal’ mindset left two options available: an offensive in the east, or 
the west. Hitler decided on the west. In December, 1944, a mere six months 
before the conclusion of the War in Europe, Germany launched its last 
major offensive in the Ardennes; an offensive that was significant to both 
Allied and Axis Powers in a time of such desperation. 
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On September 16, 1944, Adolf Hitler had his daily morning meeting 
in his office with Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, the German High Command of 
the Armed Forces (OKW) and the Armed Forces Operations Staff, including 
Generaldfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel (Mawdsley, 2009, p. 391; Parker, 
1997, p. 233; Whiting, 1985, pp. 10-11). Jodl, as the Chief of the Operations 
Staff, who was charged with planning and operations, announced 
Germany’s grim situation. Amongst the various other matters, the heavily 
valued port of Antwerp was currently in Allied hands (Whiting, 1985, p. 
23). Not yet fully operational, Antwerp had the potential to drastically 
increase the amount of supplies available and speed up the Allied drive into 
Germany (Bradley, 1975, p. 416). Both Allied Forces in the West and 
Soviet Forces in the East were regrouping and organising supply lines and 
replacements troops, resulting in them being unable, for the time-being, to 
continue movement towards Germany (Evans, 2008b, p. 657). After Jodl 
discussed the Allied situation Hitler suddenly announced his decision that 
he firmly believed would turn the war back in Germany’s favour: "‘I have 
just made a momentous decision. I shall go over to the counter-attack, that is 
to say…here, out of the Ardennes, with the objective--Antwerp’” (cited in 
Cole, p. 2). 
The decision to form an offensive in the west with Antwerp as the 
main objective was based upon the facts that the Soviet Red Army was 
overwhelming in comparison to the Western Allies, and the distances in the 
Soviet Union were too large to gain any major objectives with the forces 
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available (Cirillo, 2003, p. 4; Whiting, 1985, p. 220). The route to Antwerp 
would be through the heavily forested region made up of the Ardennes and 
Eifel, a distance of 150 kilometres (Cole, 1965, p. 39; Whiting, 1985, p. 23). 
The small towns in the area are essential to the road system, the most 
important being Bastogne in the south and St. Vith and Malmédy in the 
north as they are essential to occupying the area (Cirillo, 2003, p. 6). The 
region is composed of forests, hills, ridges and valleys with the main rivers 
being the Meuse and the Our (Dupuy, et al., 1994, p. 10; MacDonald, 1993, 
p. 19) Cole (1965) describes the terrain: “The area through which Hitler 
chose to launch his counteroffensive was, with the exception of the Vosges, 
the most difficult terrain on the entire line of the Western Front” (p. 39).  
 In December 1944, the ninety-six kilometre front of the Ardennes 
was defended by four divisions of the VIII Corps, U.S. First Army, 12th 
Army Group, commanded by Corps Commander Major General Troy 
Middleton (Dupuy, et al., 1994; MacDonald, 1984, p. 50). With only the 
4th, 28th and 106th Infantry Divisions and 9th Armoured Division, totalling 
68,822 troops, defending such a vast area, the Allies were obviously not 
expecting an attack (Bradley, 1975, p. 439; Eisenhower, 1997, p. 345; 
Smith, 2014). Hitler based the plan on this assumption (Cole, 1965, p. 48). 
Eisenhower describes the reasoning for the decision to place only four 
divisions along the front, “Our conclusion was that in the Ardennes region 
we were running a definite risk but we believed it to be a mistaken policy to 
suspend our attacks all along the front merely to make ourselves safe until 
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all reinforcements arriving from the United States could bring us up to peak 
strength” (p. 228). Two of the divisions in the Ardennes were ‘green’ units, 
meaning they were newly formed. The remaining two were veteran 
divisions resting and refitting after months of heavy fighting (Cirillo, 2003, 
p. 7; MacDonald, 1984). Under General Montgomery, the British 21st Army 
Group and the First Canadian Army were situated north of the Ardennes and 
under General Devers, elements of the the U.S. 6th Army Group were in the 
south (MacDonald, 1984, p. 49-50). Hitler aimed to capitalise on the Allied 
decision to only lightly defend the area. 
Hitler’s military advisors were struggling with his decision. Their 
desire to act in accordance with the Führer’s orders was contrasted by the 
desire to act according to appropriate military tactics and planning. The 
literature makes an important note to almost all aspects of Hitler’s plans for 
the offensive being almost identical to the offensive which took place 
through the Ardennes in 1940 which resulted in great success (Forty, 2000; 
Goolrick & Tanner, 1979). Despite the differences in season, weather and 
most importantly the current state of the German Army, and the United 
States defenders being of greater calibre than the French Army in 1940, the 
offensive was almost a carbon copy (Cole, 1965, p. 18; Forty, 2000, p. 65). 
Jodl, as the Chief of the Operations Staff, was tasked with making a detailed 
plan according to the German Army’s capabilities; however Hitler 
continuously argued that Antwerp as the objective was non-negotiable 
(Cole, 1965, p. 17). Jodl disagreed but the plan went forth to Gerd von 
Rundstedt, the Commander-in-Chief West, and Field Marshal Walter Model 
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of Army Group B, whose Armies were to form the attack. Both men quickly 
agreed with Jodl that the objective was as von Rundstedt states, “far too 
ambitious” (cited in MacDonald, 1984, p. 35). It should also be noted that 
von Rundstedt was only recently reinstated to Commander-in-Chief West 
after Hitler had taken the position from him earlier in the year - another 
aspect Hitler was attempting to recreate from the 1940 offensive.  Just a few 
of the problems with the plan included German troops having less training 
and experience than they had in 1940, the supplies available not being in 
proportion to the objective, the Allie’s air superiority, the Army’s flanks 
would be exposed, and the need for manpower would require changes to 
conscription and men fighting in the East (Cole, 1965, p. 25; Forty, 2000, p. 
42; Parker, 1997, p. 73). 
In an attempt to give the German Army a chance at success, the 
leaders discussed five alternative plans that would be appropriate for the 
physical forces available to them and according to the state of morale after 
five years of war (Hart, 1983, p. 447). All plans were dismissed; Hitler’s 
failure to logically assess the disagreements put forward by his staff resulted 
in the plan moving forward with little alterations. Following this, the Army 
commanders who were to be involved then became privy to the plan. 
Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Josef “Sepp” Dietrich of the Sixth Panzer 
Army, General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel of the Fifth Panzer 
Army and General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger of the Seventh 
Army also all disagreed. Von Manteuffel and his superior, Model, managed 
to get Hitler to change various tactical details but it became apparent that the 
28 
 
offensive would be executed according to the plan set forth months earlier 
by Hitler (Cole, 1965, p. 173). Dietrich, whose Army was to form the main 
thrust asserts his opinion: 
 
All Hitler wants me to do is cross a river, capture Brussels, and 
then go on and take Antwerp! And all this in the worst time of 
the year through the Ardennes where the snow is waist deep and 
there isn’t room to deploy four tanks abreast let alone armored 
divisions! Where it doesn’t get light until eight and it’s dark 
again at four and with re-formed divisions made up chiefly of 
kids and sick old men – and at Christmas! (MacDonald, 1984, p. 
37) 
 
The plan was as follows: Army Group B under Field Marshal Walter 
Model would have three armies for the offensive. Beginning at 5:30am on 
December 16, 1944, the three armies would launch their attacks with 
infantry, followed by tanks, through the Ardennes between Monschau and 
Echternach (Dupuy, et al., 1994, p. 17; Hart, 1983, p. 458). The Sixth 
Panzer Army under the leadership of Dietrich would be the main attacking 
army and would be opposing the U.S. 99th Infantry of the V Corps. They 
were to move northeast, cross the Meuse River between Liege and Huy, 
then continue to Antwerp (Cole, 1965, p. 19; Hart, 1983, p. 198). They were 
to capture the town, Malmédy, in doing so. The Fifth Panzer Army under 
von Manteuffel were to cover the left flank of Dietrich’s Army by holding 
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the line approximately 15 miles to its south with the towns Dinant, Namur, 
Brussels and Antwerp along this line (Cole, 1965, p. 75). In doing so, the 
Fifth Panzer Army would cross the Meuse River between Huy and Dinant 
then move on to Brussels (Parker, 1997, p. 236). They were facing the U.S. 
106th and 28th Infantry Divisions and were to capture St. Vith and Bastogne 
(Toland, 1999, p. 20). The Seventh Army under Brandenberger was to 
provide a supplementary role; composed mainly of infantry, their aim was 
to cover the south flank of the Fifth Panzer Army and would be facing the 
U.S. 28th and 4th Infantry Divisions. The first objective of reaching the 
Meuse River was to be reached in four days (Cirillo, 2003, p. 28). The need 
to successfully recapture Antwerp quickly was essential before the Allies 
could produce a staunch defense. If successful, Cirillo (2003) states that a 
third of the Allied ground forces would be annihilated (p. 5). 
Although Antwerp was the major objective of the offensive, scholars 
studying the offensive discuss additional aims. Along with the logistical 
problems resulting from the capture of Antwerp, Hugh M. Cole, the United 
States Army’s official historian, in his official text, The Battle of the Bulge 
(1965), states Hitler declared the separation and encirclement of the British 
(and Canadian) forces to the north from the United States forces in the south 
would lead to chaos between British and United States leaders (p. 17). He 
saw the Allied coalition as a front with tension and conflict behind what he 
considered an allied façade. Once the Allies were destroyed and in 
disagreement with one another, Hitler believed this would force them to 
surrender and he could force a separate peace treaty from the East then 
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focus solely on destroying the Soviets (Cooke & Evans, 2008, p. 9; Whiting, 
1985, p. 22). 
 Along with the obvious need for an advantage in physical and moral 
forces, German success was heavily dependent on a number of factors. 
Danny S. Parker in his text, Hitler's Ardennes Offensive: The German view 
of the Battle of the Bulge (1997), assembled various interviews and essays 
by the key leaders involved in the offensive. Jodl, von Manteuffel, and 
Brandenberger all state that a primary factor necessary for success would be 
extreme weather, that of fog, mist, rain, heavy winds and snow (pp. 6, 141, 
225) This would force the grounding of the superior Allied air force (Cirillo, 
2003, p. 5). The importance of the air force is evident in Eisenhower’s 
(1997) memoir as he states, “As long as the weather kept our planes on the 
ground it would be an ally of the enemy worth many additional divisions” 
(p. 345). This grounding would firstly, prevent the Allies from conducting 
aerial reconnaissance and discovering the massive build-up in the Schnee-
Eifel (p. 346), secondly, prevent the Allies from conducting defensive 
operations from the air, and lastly, from dropping essential supplies to their 
troops. 
 The prevention of Allied intelligence becoming privy to the 
upcoming offensive would also be dependent on keeping any information 
pertaining to the offensive secret. Hitler was so insistent on total secrecy 
that historian, Cole (1965), states the death penalty was the ultimate 
consequence and the small number of men privy to the plan were required to 
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sign contracts as to this condition (p. 49). In addition, the offensive was 
named ‘Wacht Am Rhein’ (Watch on the Rhine) to appear to be a defensive 
action (Cooke & Evans, 2008, p. 9), misinformation was purposefully 
recorded in documents (MacDonald, 1984, p. 39, 40), and a complete radio 
silence was ordered (Cirillo, 2003, p. 10; Dupuy, et al., 1994, p. 37). The 
secrecy that was so essential was necessary to successfully surprise (and 
then destroy) the four divisions that defended the area. If any information 
was to be discovered by the Allies, they would quickly reinforce the area 
and the possibility of procuring Antwerp would be even more improbable. 
 The tactic known as Blitzkrieg, involving surprise and speed, was 
often employed by the German Army in World War (Evans, 2008b, p. 179; 
Hart, 1970, p. 27). With total secrecy, the ability to surprise the four 
divisions, the 4th, 29th and 106th Infantry Divisions and the 9th Armoured 
Divisions of the First Army, in the Ardennes was essential as it would 
provide the ultimate advantage (Smith, 2014). The Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) deemed the Ardennes not conducive 
to an offensive and consequently, were not concerned with such a 
possibility and placed only four divisions in defense of the area (Smith, 
2014). The lack of Allied intelligence (of which they were usually highly 
confident in) also contributed to this assessment and would assist in the next 
factor necessary for success in the Allied High Command underestimating 
the force of the attack and failing to produce swift countermeasures 
(Blumenson, 1985, p. 245). If so, the first elements of the German Army 
were expecting to reach the Meuse River in less than four days (Parker, 
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1997, p. 6). However, to do so they were dependent on fuel. If the German 
Army were to reach Antwerp, the capture of Allied fuel supplies that were 
located in Liege and Verdun to the west of the Meuse River were essential 
(Eisenhower, 1997, p. 338, 348-9). Supplies were so low that the German 
Army was not expected to even reach Antwerp without obtaining the 
enemy’s supplies. 
 The Ardennes Offensive, more commonly known as the “Battle of 
the Bulge” due to the German penetration creating a bulge in the Allied line 
began on December 16, 1944 (Eisenhower, 1997, p. 335). The planning and 
execution took place entirely under Adolf Hitler’s personal command. His 
interference in the planning stages was filled with disagreement from his 
military advisors and generals. Yet the offensive moved forward with the 
main objective being to capture the port of Antwerp. Relying on various 
aspects for success, the offensive needed to employ total secrecy and the 
tactic of Blitzkrieg if it were to have any chance of successfully surprising 
and destroying Allied forces in the region. To provide further insight into 
why the Ardennes Offensive failed so miserably for the German Army the 
following chapter will analyse the utilisation and effects of physical forces. 
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Chapter Three 
Physical Forces in the Ardennes 
 
When analysing the Ardennes Offensive we must first make ourselves 
acquainted with the physical forces as these provide qualitative figures that 
become the foundation for further examination, and the basis for Chapter 
Four’s analysis of moral forces as the two are interconnected. This chapter 
will demonstrate the physical standings at the offensive’s commencement as 
the offensive was dependent on a large physical advantage. Following this, 
the discussion will then center on how each side utilised their physical 
forces, whether this utilisation was advantageous, and the effects of this. 
Physical Standings of the German and Allied Armies 
Carl von Clausewitz in Book Three, Chapter 8 of On War (1993), 
originally published in 1832, classifies physical forces as one of the five 
elements of strategy that characterise an engagement (p. 215). The 
framework for physical forces consists of three elements: the size of the 
armed forces, their composition, and their armament (materiel and 
equipment). These elements are often the focus when examining historical 
military events and often the only strategic element examined. This is 
fundamentally flawed for two reasons. Firstly, according to Clausewitz, 
military action, and warfare itself, is never concentrated against physical 
forces alone, it is also concentrated against moral elements, and always 
endeavours to break-down an adversary’s moral forces (p. 157). Secondly, 
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physical destruction will always have a moral effect; consequently the two, 
physical and moral, cannot be analysed without consideration for the other. 
However, this is not to say that physical forces are not important; in fact, the 
opposite is true: their importance is impossible to overlook. Without an 
appropriate armed force utilising modern and quality equipment the armed 
force has little chance of success as all warfare is based on the destruction of 
an enemy’s force, and the way to achieve this is primarily through the 
utilisation of physical forces (p. 111). 
When analysing the utilisation of German and Allied physical forces 
in the Ardennes Offensive it seems appropriate to initially concentrate on 
their physical standings at its commencement on December 16, 1944. The 
first of the three theoretical principles stipulated by Clausewitz in On War 
(1993) Book Three, Chapter 8 is the ‘most general principle of victory’: 
superiority of numbers, meaning a vastly superior army in terms of numbers 
is the element most closely aligned with victory (p. 155, 228). Although it 
would be naïve to state that numbers alone determine an engagement’s 
outcome, it is extremely important (Brodie cited in Clausewitz, 1993, p. 
296). The German Army as the attacking force quite clearly had the 
advantage in terms of the size of their armed force (Ambrose, 2001, p. 173). 
With three armies, the Sixth Panzer Army, the Fifth Panzer Army, and the 
Seventh Army involved, the total number of German troops attacking Allied 
Forces in the Ardennes was over 250,000 (Morelock, 1994, p. 7; Toland, 
1959, p. x). United States Forces occupying and defending the 100-
kilometre front totalled 68,822, Morelock (1994) accounts it to “one soldier 
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for every 2 meters” the majority of which were the VIII Corps, which 
consisted of just over three divisions (Morelock, 1994, p. 235; Toland, 
1959. p. 12). Following Clausewitz’s theoretical principles, with German 
Forces outnumbering Allied Forces to such a high degree the Germans held 
the principle of victory at the offensive’s commencement with numerical 
superiority. 
After examining the quantity of troops, we must now turn to the 
quality and composition. Situated in the Ardennes on December 16 were 
Major General Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps, consisting of just over three 
divisions. The Ardennes was described as “the nursery and the old folk’s 
home of the American command” (cited in Morelock, 1994, p. 30) which 
refers to the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions who were resting and refitting 
after heavy fighting in the Huertgen Forest in October and November 1944; 
they were undermanned and exhausted (Morelock, 1994, p. 234; Toland, 
1999, pp. 4, 5). The remaining two divisions were on the opposite end of the 
scale: the 106th Infantry Division had only recently arrived and had no 
experience in combat. The remaining troops made up the 9th Armoured 
Division. The 28th, the veteran division, and the 106th, the inexperienced 
division, were the main target by the German Army on December 16 in the 
battle for Antwerp. The German Army was in a similar situation with the 
character of its troops; with five years of continuous warfare the German 
Army was forced to modify the enlistment age – dropping to 16 years and 
increasing to 60 years (Cole, 1965; Morelock, 1994, pp. 22-23). In doing so, 
they were able to create 25 new ‘Volksgrandier Divisions’, however these 
36 
 
divisions were not adequately trained and were not appropriately equipped 
for such a large undertaking (Cirillo, 2003, p. 4). Many of these new 
divisions were involved in the offensive. In contrast to the four U.S. 
divisions involved on December 16, the German Army had thirteen infantry 
divisions, seven panzer divisions and two panzer brigades (Cirillo, 2003, p. 
4). The German Army held physical superiority in almost all respects. 
The German Army’s advantage in physical forces becomes even 
more apparent with the final element of armament. Whilst we are forced to 
adapt Clausewitz’s nineteenth century thinking to modern equipment, the 
theory remains unchanged. Historians, including Morelock (1994) and Cole 
(1965) offer a comprehensive account of the materiel and equipment 
available to either side. In his text, Generals of the Ardennes: American 
Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge, J.D. Morelock (1994) expands on the 
figures by providing a detailed comparison of the equipment utilised by 
infantrymen, tankers and artillerymen in the Ardennes Offensive. In 1944 
the U.S. had the advantage in superior infantry and artillery equipment in 
terms of both quality and supply, particularly shoulder weapons; however as 
the offensive intensified the Germans actually had the advantage at almost 
eight to one in infantry; they were also superior in machine pistols and 
machine guns (Cole, 1965). Similarly, the Germans also had the advantage 
to their U.S. equivalent in infantry support and antitank weapons (Morelock, 
1994, p. 14, 22). The major difference, however, was in tanks. The German 
Panther and Tiger tanks were renowned in World War II, forcing the U.S. to 
attempt to compete not in quality but in quantity of their Sherman tanks. At 
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its commencement, Morelock states the Germans had a four to one 
advantage in tanks totalling fourteen hundred against the 242 of the VIII 
Corps (Morelock, 1994, p. 7, 235; Toland, 1999, p. x). On the other hand, 
the U.S Army had become increasingly mobile; the German Army could not 
compare, still relying on horses for transport even after five years of war. 
Lastly, air support initially favoured the Germans simply for the fact that the 
weather conditions prevented Allied Forces from utilising their air support 
for intelligence purposes, logistical reinforcement, and offensive tactics 
(Morelock, 1994, p. 15). This last element was a major factor in the 
planning of the offensive. 
Morelock (1994) presents an interesting depiction of the U.S. Army 
in World War II that had a large effect on the utilisation of their physical 
forces: standardization (p. 11, 12). U.S. standardization created yet another 
distinction with the German Army as it allowed for a more resourceful use 
of materiel, equipment and supplies; whereas the German Army, with its 
unstandardized organisation resulted in a lack of efficiency as specialised 
divisions relied on varied resources and this “could impact on supply, 
maintenance and training and a commander’s tactical control” (p. 12). The 
increased mobility of the U.S. Army by 1944, and its standardization, made 
it one of the greatest armies in the world (Cole, 1965). However, the 
German Army’s superiority of numbers was great, thus if they could break 
through to the west in an undermanned region, destroy as many Allied 
forces as possible and dash through to Antwerp, Adolf Hitler believed it 
would change the tide of the war. The Ardennes region, defended by only 
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four infantry divisions totalling less than 70,000 troops, was this ideal 
region. 
The Utilisation and Effects of Physical Forces 
 
The literature largely agrees that the German Army effectively 
utilised their superiority of numbers by applying Clausewitz’s principle 
aligning with this superiority – the maximum use of force (Cirillo, 2003; 
Eisenhower, 1997; Hart, 1983). By employing a complete silence and strict 
confidentiality clause (with serious consequences if broken) they managed 
to successfully build-up an enormous physical force with Allied intelligence 
remaining uninformed, apart from heresy from locals that was quickly 
dismissed (Bradley, 1975; Eisenhower, 1997). Hitler firmly believed that 
with their numerical superiority the German Army would quickly overrun 
the four divisions defending the Ardennes. General Hasso von Manteuffel 
(cited in Parker, 1997) describes the plan: The plan was for the troops of the 
Sixth Panzer Army to form the main thrust against two U.S. divisions in the 
north-east and reach Antwerp in less than a week by crossing the Meuse 
River between Líege and Huy (cited in Morelock, 1994, p. 5). The Fifth 
Panzer Army was to cross the Meuse River between Namur and Dinant and 
the Seventh Army was to protect the flank. On December 16, thirteen 
infantry divisions and seven panzer divisions thrust through the Ardennes to 
attack the surprised Allied Forces accompanied by one thousand tanks 
(Cirillo, 2003, p. 4). Historians examining this offensive have provided 
another layer of interest by observing the utilisation of an SS Army, the 
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Sixth Panzer, in the main role. Parker’s (1997) text, Hitler's Ardennes 
Offensive: The German View of the Battle of the Bulge, implies this was no 
coincidence and was purely for the glory that would result from the 
expected victory. Hitler wanted this glory to be placed upon the SS, not the 
regular German Army. 
While many historians, including Parker (1997) identify the initial 
German superiority as an initial advantage, further research discovered that 
this advantage was unable to be effectively exploited. The sheer volume and 
force of German armament clogged the roads due to the unsuitable terrain 
creating a build-up of supply lines and traffic jams (the poorly constructed 
roads also meant that the U.S. Army’s mobility became a large advantage) 
(Cole, 1965). The utilisation of such a large volume of tanks and equipment 
was also reliant on an adequate fuel supply, of which the German Army did 
not have (Parker, 1997). Consequently, the need to capture Allied fuel 
supplies became a major operation during the execution of the offensive; the 
need to quickly cross the Meuse River was, in part, because of the fuel 
supplies located there (Toland, 1999). With a fuel supply adequate for less 
than a 100 kilometre journey, and a terrain obstructing tanks and equipment, 
fuel was used at a higher rate than expected (McManus, 2007). The German 
Forces were then unable to utilise their physical forces to their full capacity. 
The utilisation of physical forces in unsuitable terrain and without the 
proper equipment became a major complication that prevented the armies 
from exploiting the surprised and undermanned area defended by the U.S. 
VIII Corps who were unprepared and unequipped for such an attack. 
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Evidence to support this can be seen in Parker’s (1997) compilation of 
interviews in which Dietrich and von Manteuffel, of the Sixth Panzer and 
Fifth Panzer Armies, state that the terrain and inadequate fuel supplies were 
major factors that assisted in their defeat. Von Manteuffel states that by the 
fourth day, it was evident that the offensive had failed. The analysis reveals 
that Clausewitz’s theoretical principle of superiority of numbers had a large 
counter effect for German Forces on the German offensive. 
The German High Command was depending on Eisenhower and his 
advisors underestimating the sheer force of the offensive and consequently 
taking an extensive amount of time to utilise U.S. strategic reserves (Cole, 
1965; Dupuy, et al., 1994). Following the December 16 breakthrough, the 
following day Eisenhower’s immediate direction for the 82d and 101st 
Airborne Divisions to move to St. Vith and Bastogne had a large effect on 
the German timetable (Ambrose, 2002, p. 197) Not only were two major 
towns now heavily defended since the arrival of the 82d and 101st Airborne 
Divisions on December 19, there were now approximately 30,000 troops 
brought into the two towns and surrounding areas, decreasing the German 
numerical advantage and preoccupying thousands of German troops. In On 
War, Clausewitz (1993) positions his view on strategic reserves, declaring it 
an ‘essential condition of strategic leadership’ to hold reserves in direct 
relation to the ‘degree of strategic uncertainty’ (p. 247). This will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five due to the moral nature of intuition 
leading this decision. However, the utilisation of such strategic reserves in 
such a rapid manner without full understanding of the situation undoubtedly 
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played a large role in preventing German Forces from exploiting the 
undermanned Ardennes (Ambrose, 2001; Cole, 1965; McManus, 2007; 
Toland, 1999). 
Along with the utilisation of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, 
the strategic reserves for the entire northwest Europe, Eisenhower (1997) 
ordered for the movement of physical forces still in Normandy to the 
Ardennes. Ambrose (2001) provides data of 250,000 men and 50,000 
vehicles moving to support Allied Forces in the Ardennes (p. 174). German 
Forces no longer had numerical superiority. The relatively clear routes 
outlined in the German planning stages were now heavily defended, creating 
additional obstacles. Ambrose (2001) boldly states the extraordinary 
movement of such a large number of forces to the Ardennes as an 
“achievement unprecedented in the history of war” (p. 174). The German 
advantage decreased even further on December 23rd, one week from the 
offensives commencement, when the weather cleared. The weather 
conditions (fog, mist, and snow) were no longer an assistive element to the 
Germans as Allied air support was now able to be brought into the 
offensive. The Allies were now able to receive reinforcement of their 
physical forces by air and were supported with additional defense 
(Ambrose, 2001, p. 186; 2002, p. 225). This was a major factor that effected 
German success in the Ardennes. 
Historians, in their examinations following the offensive, and the 
major German leaders involved before and during the offensive, agree that a 
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key element needed for German success was to successfully surprise the 
U.S. VIII Corps defending the Ardennes and consequently Allied leaders 
(Parker, 1997; Toland, 1999). Clausewitz describes surprise as “the means 
to gain superiority” (1993, p. 233). Utilising physical forces in conjunction 
with surprise can result in a devastating moral effect on the enemy, creating 
chaos and confusion, and allowing the surprised defenders little time to 
comprehend the attack. The Germany Army frequently utilised their 
physical forces through the medium of surprise throughout the war (and 
were highly successful in doing so). While by 1944 it was a well-known 
tactic by the enemy, in the 1944 Ardennes Offensive it was highly 
successful in its effect; chaos and confusion formed amongst the troops 
defending the Ardennes following the December 16 breakthrough and 
continued to the highest personnel. Allied commanders differed heavily in 
their strategies to combat the breakthrough, and as there was not one sole 
ground commander, disagreements prevented quick response to the attack. 
Eisenhower, in an attempt to revert the chaos that had resulted, deemed it 
necessary to have one sole ground commander. The effect of the German 
breakthrough was a complete command handover of ground forces north of 
Bastogne to General Montgomery on December 20, 1944 (Morelock, 1994, 
p. 64, 66). The chaos and disorder that German High Command was 
expecting amongst Allied High Command, was certainly an effect of the 
breakthrough. 
Whilst unrelated to any specific principles recognised by Clausewitz, 
the effect of disagreement between these key players undoubtedly effected 
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the eventual utilisation of physical forces. With Montgomery’s new control, 
he became, according to Eisenhower (1997) and General Bradley (1975), 
over-cautious and unwilling to commit to a swift counterattack. Weigley 
(cited in Morelock, 1994, p.68) distinguishes Montgomery as focusing 
strategically on organising forces for the final goal of defeating German 
forces by pushing into Berlin and ending the war under his single control as 
ground forces commander. Thus, Montgomery extending the Ardennes 
Offensive was a consequence of him planning beyond the offensive and 
centering these plans upon recognition and ultimately his envisaged 
reputation. Eisenhower, on the other hand, wanted a swift counterattack to 
take control of the offensive and defeat Germany’s last reserves which 
would ultimately affect the Allied drive across the Ruhr and into Germany 
(Morelock, 1994, p. 68). Following this a major consequence of the 
utilisation of physical forces and the change in command was the 
relationships between the military leaders. 
 As shown, the decision on when to form a counterattack was a 
source of major disagreement between Allied leaders. The utilisation of 
physical forces by Montgomery in the counteroffensive was deemed slow 
by Eisenhower and various other commanders (Bradley, 1975, p. 416; 
Morelock, 1994, p. 68). Eisenhower wanted to “exploit the opportunity” 
(Weigley, cited in Morelock, p. 68) produced by the German offensive as he 
saw it as an opportunity to capitalise on by destroying as many German 
forces, materiel and equipment as possible to make the eventual journey into 
Germany easier (Morelock, 1994, p. 63). Consequently, he sought to initiate 
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a counteroffensive as quickly as possible once strategic reserves and 
additional forces had moved into play to assist in the defense of the 
Ardennes. Whilst General George S. Patton, commander of the U.S. Third 
Army had initiated his part of the counteroffensive in late December, it was 
not until January 3, 1945 that Montgomery initiated his part of the 
counteroffensive (Ambrose, 2001, p. 191). The literature refers to this date 
as the beginning of Allied movement into Germany. The effect of this slow 
utilisation of physical forces was large. Ultimately, it allowed a large 
amount of German troops to withdraw and join the final defense of 
Germany, and also affected the Allies own timetable as the Armies did not 
link up until two weeks later on January 17, 1945, one week before the 
conclusion of the offensive (Ambrose, 2001, p. 191). 
The utilisation of physical forces was also a source of disagreement 
amongst German commanders, with the majority stating that the quantity of 
physical forces did not align with the objective. As the physical components 
were vastly different from those involved in the 1940 offensive, their use 
and the calibre was a source of disagreement. Evidence of the obvious state 
of physical forces not matching with the objective can be seen in the 
interviews conducted following the conclusion of World War II with the 
generals involved in the Ardennes Offensive (Parker, 1997). Dietrich stated 
that from the planning stage he knew the undertaking was not likely to 
succeed. Even with this initial advantage, the generals still did not agree 
with the proportion of physical forces (Parker, 1997). Additional support for 
this lies in von Manteuffel’s interview. Thus, while they may have had the 
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initial advantage in numbers alone, von Manteuffel in a post-war interview 
admitted that he proclaimed the lesser calibre of the current state of the 
German Army than the German Army in 1940 (of which the 1944 Ardennes 
Offensive was based). Further evidence to support this claim is discussed 
largely in the literature. The addition of one million young, old and injured 
men resulted in a need to decrease training and attempt to bridge this gap by 
increased equipment (Toland, 1999). While German Forces may have had 
the advantage in numbers the quality of troops decreased. 
Clausewitz (1993) states the effects of effort can be seen in the loss 
of forces and territory (p. 105). In analysing the Ardennes Offensive these 
effects are evident. Arguably, the greatest effect throughout the five week 
period was the loss of thousands of troops, and large numbers of material 
and equipment. The effects of the ineffective utilisation of physical forces 
by German forces was casualties totalling over 100,000, or one fifth of the 
forces utilised, that ultimately resulted in no territory gained or objectives 
seized, and that should have been used in the final defense of Germany 
(MacDonald, 1984). On the Allied side, the effect was 80,000 casualties, of 
the 600,000 troops utilised, that resulted from defending territory they were 
already occupying (Ambrose, 2001, p. 173). However, whilst the physical 
effects were important, equally as important were the effects on moral 
forces. As Clausewitz (1993) states: 
Physical casualties are not the only losses incurred by both sides 
in the course of the engagement: their moral strength is also 
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shaken, broken and ruined. In deciding whether or not to continue 
the engagement it is not enough to consider the loss of men, 
horses and guns; one also has to weigh the loss of order, courage, 
confidence, cohesion, and planning. The decision rests chiefly on 
the state of morale, which, in cases where the victor has lost as 
much as the vanquished, has always been the single decisive 
factor (p. 273). 
Thus, it seems appropriate to now turn to the analysis of the utilisation and 
effects of moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive. 
This chapter demonstrates the effect of the German Forces relying on 
unreliable aspects, such as the slow response from Allied Forces to the 
offensive, the requirement of capturing Allied fuel supplies, and weather 
conditions favouring German movement by forced grounding of U.S. air 
support. This chapter reveals the initial German superiority of numbers was 
not effectively exploited due to ineffective planning and study of the 
Ardennes terrain and the unmatched physical forces to the geographical 
conditions. On December 23rd, one week following the commencement, the 
final element of weather seemed to decide the fate of the German offensive. 
By the offensive’s conclusion, over 600,000 Allied troops had been 
involved and over 500,000 German troops. The analysis concludes that 
whilst the initial superiority was with the Germans, the quick movement by 
Allied leaders quickly evened the playing field (Ambrose, 2001, p. 184). 
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Chapter Four 
Moral Forces in the Ardennes 
 
Now that we have analysed physical forces that are quantifiable and 
therefore comparable, it is time to turn to the moral. The previous chapter 
demonstrated the disproportion of physical forces advantageous to German 
Forces in the first stage of the Ardennes Offensive.  Beginning on December 
16, 1944, 250,000 German forces broke through the Ardennes. Defended by 
68,822 United States troops, German forces were expecting to reach the 
Meuse River in just four days before moving towards Antwerp under the 
expectation that their superiority of numbers would overpower the lightly 
defended area (Cirillo, 2003). However, the addition of unsuitable terrain, 
lack of fuel, and unpredictable weather conditions created additional 
obstacles that prevented the effective utilisation of the physical forces. 
Whilst these obstacles contributed to slow attacking movements, allowing 
Allied Force to regroup, reorganise and move troops to join the defense, an 
analysis of the offensive reveals another element crucial to Allied defense of 
the area: moral forces. The courage, morale, and skill of the commanders 
involved contributes to the explanation of why Allied Forces were able to 
hold off the initial attack before the physical forces were able to be equalled. 
Various events, including the Siege of Bastogne, were physically 
unbalanced, thus an explanation can be derived from analysing the 
utilisation and effects of moral forces to provide support for the notion that 
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physical and moral forces combined to produce Allied success in the 
Ardennes. 
In On War (1993), Carl von Clausewitz states that “The highest of all 
moral qualities in times of danger is courage” (p. 97), adding “courage is the 
soldier’s first requirement” (p. 116). There are three types of courage in 
Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces, however only the first will be 
discussed. This type of courage - courage when in ‘personal danger’ - 
consists of two elements: Clausewitz states it may be an ‘indifference to 
danger’ which may result from a variety of reasons but is most often due to 
habit (Kleemeier, 2007, p. 115). The second source of courage when in 
danger is ‘positive motives’ such as patriotism or ambition. Clausewitz has 
very specific comments on both. He states that when courage is the result of 
habit it is a constant condition and will not let one down; the second is an 
emotion; it is not as dependable but will have greater results (Clausewitz, 
1993, p. 116). The combination of both types is the most effective as it will 
result in dependable, great actions. Both Allied and German Forces 
undoubtedly showed courage over the five week period, however the 
sources of courage is what differentiates the adversaries. An important point 
to note is that, by this time, Germany was “forced to turn to their children to 
fight the war to a conclusion” (Ambrose, 2002, p. 207; Goolrick & Tanner, 
1979). For the German Forces this meant that while these new combatants 
had little to no experience and could therefore not rely on courage sourced 
from habit, they had grown-up only with memories of their nation under 
Hitler’s regime and the ruling of Nazi ideology over all aspects of life 
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(Goolrick & Tanner, 1979). In many cases these young men would be 
considered more patriotic than their elders in the Wehrmacht and following 
Clausewitz’s theory would produce greater acts of courage. 
The literature revealed that the Allied courage was formed by both 
indifference to danger - through habit and routine - and positive motives, but 
mostly by the former (Ambrose, 2001). The German courage is of greater 
interest. Whilst certainly a result of habit, many soldiers had been in combat 
since 1939, and built an endurance to fear through courage. The source of 
the courage was through positive motives, most notably patriotism and their 
deep belief in the rise of the Fatherland (Baldwin, 1981). However, Whiting 
(1985) reveals an unusual source of courage; one that certainly does not 
subsume itself under positive motives. His research exposed the already 
commonly conjectured use of threats and internal fear as the motive for 
courage; Whiting states that under the orders of Heinrich Himmler any 
soldier “deserting to the enemy would be arrested and sent to a 
concentration camp” (p. 56-57). In view of this information we could state 
that courage formed from this source, was not natural and organic, but 
fabricated. We are unable to statistically evaluate whether this had any 
effect on the results, nonetheless it is important to mention. 
It is here we must turn the discussion to Clausewitz’s concept of 
‘friction’ as all the contending elements, such as weather, lack of 
intelligence, and exhaustion, can be labelled as such. Friction is composed 
of those aspects that interfere with the “effective application of force” 
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(Clausewitz, 1993, p. 18). Friction is effectively the elements that prevent 
action from going exactly according to plan. In simpler terms, as Clausewitz 
succinctly describes it, friction is the elements that “distinguish real war 
from war on paper” (p. 138). Friction caused major chaos during the 
Ardennes Offensive, particularly as German military leaders were well 
aware of its effect. Here is an example of how they utilised courage to create 
friction for the Allied forces: on direct orders from Hitler, an operation to 
support the Ardennes Offensive was initiated prior to the offensive’s 
December 16 commencement. It was named Operation Greif and was under 
the command of Major Otto Skorzeny (Weingartner, 1979, p. 191). 
Skorzeny and 500 men of the 150th Panzer Brigade were to attempt to 
infiltrate Allied lines by pretending to be American and British soldiers 
(Ambrose, 2002, p. 189; Whiting, 1985, p. 8). They did so by wearing 
stolen American and British uniforms, speaking fluent English, and wearing 
dog tags stolen from those killed in action (Weingartner, 1979, p. 209). The 
effect was immediate: fear spread quickly through the lines (Goolrick & 
Tanner, 1979, p. 58). Operation Greif was an operation formed from 
courage; courage was utilised at every step and was sourced from the 
motivation of patriotism for the cause, and the longing for honour. 
Knowingly conducting an operation that would most likely get one’s self 
killed is a courageous action like no other. However, these men were not 
simply on the offensive, moving towards physically and morally harming 
the enemy; these soldiers were attempting to infiltrate Allied lines and 
interact with their adversary in the attempt to create chaos, destroy 
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communication lines, capture fuel dumps, and most importantly capture 
bridges (Parker, 1997, p. 21). Utilising courage in this manner resulted in 
the opposite of this moral force in Allied forces: fear. The effect of 
Operation Greif was felt all through the Allied line. A game of cat and 
mouse ensued in the attempt to find the imposters, taking valuable thought 
away from defensive actions and slowing down operations as it became 
mandatory for soldiers to prove their nationality by answering questions that 
United States troops would recognise such as the name of certain United 
States baseball players (Whiting, 1985, p. 9). Courage was therefore 
exploited by German forces not just to inflict physical casualties, but to 
effect moral forces in the same capacity. 
Morale, termed ‘military spirit’ by Clausewitz, is the most widely 
discussed moral force in warfare. Morale is commonly regarded as the 
stimulus of a soldier’s strength which is shown by his ability to continue 
with a high level of skilled fighting in constant danger. While the definition 
of morale differs according to occupation, the one that will form the basis of 
this analysis is defined by Clausewitz (1993) as “the troops’ national feeling 
(enthusiasm, fanatical zeal, faith and general temper” (1993, p. 221). Morale 
is important as it effects every aspect of warfare as the feeling on behalf of 
one man generally effects the next until the ‘spirit of the whole’ is one. 
Accordingly, it becomes the task of an army to not only inflict physical 
casualties on its enemy, but to also reduce the enemy’s morale as this will 
not only increase the physical casualties, it will limit the courageous actions 
of its enemy, increase the likelihood of surrender, and in many cases, result 
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in the loss of confidence in military leaders (which will have its own 
effects). 
According to Clausewitz there are two sources of morale; continuous 
success in engagements and the use of an army’s greatest strength (1993, p. 
222) and, similar to most of his thinking, Clausewitz adds that they must 
interact to produce morale. Through this thinking, the analysis revealed that 
the source of morale for the Allies was indeed the continuous success they 
had experienced since they became directly involved in World War II by the 
invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944 (Forty, 2000, p. 83). Since then they 
had continually been on the offensive; and had used every effort available to 
them. It is easy to understand why those soldiers in the Ardennes, who were 
either resting and refitting or replacements training to enter combat, were 
“buoyed with success” and strongly believed they would be home by 
Christmas (Hal C. Pattison cited in Cole, 1993, p. vii). Whiting (1985) 
shows the unity of morale between the ranks, describing the national feeling 
amongst the troops as ‘relaxed’ and the commanders ‘confident’ (p. 4, 33). 
The morale among the German troops was described by Whiting as 
‘nervous and tense’ (p. 88). The German Army had been on the defensive 
for many months; however they continued to fight with all their power as 
they “seemed to have found new strength and determination to resist” 
(Forty, 2002, p. 30). 
The Malmédy Massacre is an example of how far the attempt to destroy 
the morale of the enemy during the Ardennes Offensive could go. In the 
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texts focused the Ardennes Offensive, of which there are hundreds if not 
thousands, nearly every one of them discusses the Malmédy Massacre 
(Cole, 1965; Cooke & Evans, 2008; MacDonald, 1984). On the 17th 
December, the second day of the offensive, the 1st Division SS 
Panzergrenadiere Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler came across Battery B, 285th 
Field Artillery Observation Battalion of the 7th Armoured Division of the 
United States Army. Under the leadership of Jochen Peiper, 1st Division 
rounded up the American soldiers they captured – who had surrendered and 
were now Prisoners of War (POW) – and opened fire, killing approximately 
84 troops. The following day the news reached all along the frontline and 
the Supreme Headquarters (Weingartner, 1979, p. 65). The effect was 
immediate: U.S. resolve and determination strengthened (Cole, p. 261; 
Goolrick & Tanner, 1979, p. 57; Weingartner, 1979, pp. 1, 2). In the 
framework of military theory, this terrible act of hostile aggression should 
have reduced morale; it did the opposite. The general temper amongst U.S. 
troops was full of anger and fury, but the effect was an increase in 
motivation as “the news of the massacre acted as a stimulant to flagging 
American resistance…” (Weingartner, 1979, p. 1) and those who may have 
been contemplating surrender quickly gave up this option. 
By taking the analysis further, into one of the main events of the 
Ardennes Offensive, the degree in which moral forces determined the final 
result becomes evident. On December 16, 1944, the German Army broke 
through Allied frontlines across the Ardennes region. Of the three main 
armies involved, the Fifth Panzer Army was selected to cover the left flank 
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of the Sixth Panzer Army (Cole, 1965, p. 75). Hasso von Manteuffel’s Fifth 
Panzer Army had multiple towns to capture in their drive to support the 
Sixth Panzer Army’s objective of Antwerp; one of which was successfully 
capturing the road-junction of Bastogne currently defended by elements of 
the United States 28th Division, VIII Corps, First Army (Cirillo, 2003; 
Marshall, 1988, p. 19; Toland, 1999, p. 20). The attack on Bastogne would 
feature three divisions of the Fifth Panzer Army; the 2d Panzer to attack on 
the right, the 26th Volksgrenadier Division on the left, and the Panzer Lehr 
Division in reserve (Marshall, 1988, p. 179). On December 16, only one 
U.S. Company was able to defend against the multiple German battalions 
that began the attack in the Bastogne area. Following the breakthrough, VIII 
Corps Commander Major General Troy Middleton was well aware of the 
importance of the road-junctions to attacking movements (Cirillo, 2003; 
Marshall, 1988, p. 19). Accordingly, he ordered troops to move towards 
Bastogne to assist in its defense. Physical forces utilised through the tactic 
of Blitzkrieg had its intended effect by creating disorder amongst the 
defenders (Eisenhower, 1997, p. 354). Theoretically, with such a superiority 
of numbers, German Forces should have completely overpowered the 
enemy captured Bastogne and raced towards the Meuse River; however the 
majority of the United States 28th division managed to hold out for at least 
one day before withdrawing (Marshall, 1988, p. 6). 
The United States 28th division were one of two veteran divisions in 
the Ardennes, and were resting and refitting after fighting in the Huertgen 
Forest (Lone Sentry, 1945); however they were still on the line. Thus, 
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through Clausewitz’s theoretical perspective it can be ascertained that the 
28th division were accustomed to combat and could rely on their habitual 
courage to respond to the attack, whereas the emotional courage formed 
from positive motives was negatively affected by the sheer physical force. 
This was demonstrated by their ability to defend their area for the initial 
days of the offensive before being forced to give up ground due to the sheer 
physical force of the enemy. S. L. A. Marshall’s (1988) U.S. Army official 
history of fighting in Bastogne during the offensive describes the state of 
troops retreating as disordered. He adds that some wandered back to the 
front line in their confusion but did not stay to defend (p. 73). The effect of 
the overpowering physical forces utilised through Blitzkrieg was unable to 
be matched by moral forces once disorder and fear settled in. However, the 
28th’s defense was essential in preventing the three German divisions from 
advancing further. If they had lacked courage due to inexperience in 
combat, they may have retreated immediately which would have allowed 
the German Army to race through to Antwerp before the Allies were able to 
put up a staunch defense. 
The effect of the breakthrough on moral forces was obvious to the 
soldiers of the United States 101st Airborne division when they moved into 
defend the area close to the town of Foy on December 19 to assist in the 
defense of Bastogne (Ambrose, 2001, p. 179) following Combat Command 
B of the 10th Armoured Division’s move to Bastogne the previous day. 
Major Richard Winter, in one of several interviews with Ambrose (2001) 
reported seeing the American soldiers defeat. Ambrose paraphrases Winters, 
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“…down the middle of the road came the defeated American troops, fleeing 
the front in disarray, moblike. Many had thrown away their rifles, their 
coats, all encumbrances. Some were in a panic, staggering, exhausted, 
shouting, ‘Run! Run! They’ll murder you! They’ll kill you! They’ve got 
everything, tanks, machine-guns, air power, everything!’” (p. 174?) 
Fortunately for the American Army, those on the receiving end of such a 
site were the veterans of the 101st Airborne Division (Burgett, 1967, p. 199) 
To those with little experience in warfare or with a lack of positive motives, 
the site of thousands of men fleeing from the direction in which they were 
moving towards would have undoubtedly shaken their courage and unsettled 
their morale, yet Winters, as well as the thousands of other troops, marched 
forward with little information and little preparation. Winters felt ashamed 
by the display, stating, “They were just babbling…it was pathetic” 
(Ambrose, 2001, p. 176). 
World War II historian, Stephen E. Ambrose’s (2001) extensive 
research into the United States Army provides a background that gives an 
interesting take to the utilisation of courage by United States forces: 
It was the policy of the U.S. Army to keep its rifle companies on 
the line for long periods…making up losses by individual 
replacement. This meant that replacements went into combat 
now not with the men they had trained and shipped overseas 
with, but with strangers. It also meant that the veteran could 
look forward to a release from the dangers threatening him only 
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through death or serious wound. This created a situation of 
endlessness and hopelessness… (p. 202) 
Of the four divisions in the Ardennes, two were green units who had little 
experience, and the remaining two were being refitted for replacements.  
What this essentially means is the replacements in the Ardennes on 
December 16 were not surrounded by men they had complete trust in as 
they were unable to build such a relationship with the veterans who had 
trained, fought and felt fear together for many years. Furthermore, they 
simply did not have the experience of combat and had not built an 
indifference to danger. Brian Drohan (2006) in his exploration of 
Clausewitz’s moral forces logically considers courage and morale to be 
linked to motivation (p. 304). This is certainly the impression given by the 
negative effect of the breakthrough on the courage and morale of the 
retreating divisions as the retreating men also eagerly gave the men of the 
101st Division their ammunition, symbolically releasing “…themselves of 
any further obligation to stand and fight” (Ambrose, 2001, p. 176-177). 
From this point forward, it became less about physical numbers and 
more about utilising moral forces. Considering the conditions, the offensive 
was bound to become a psychological battle. The Supreme Commander of 
the Allied Forces, General Eisenhower’s intellect and skill as a military 
leader was most evident during the first few days of the offensive. Utilising 
airborne divisions such as the 82d and 101st was certainly a strategic move, 
not simply because of their experience and the recognition of the knowledge 
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of their ability, but because of the moral forces that result from these. Both 
divisions had experienced almost constant fighting against German forces 
since the invasion of Normandy (Ambrose, 2001; 2002; Cole, 1965). 
Therefore, the courage utilised in the Ardennes was largely due to habit, 
these men were not unaccustomed to the chaos they were suddenly thrown 
into. The 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions were notified on 17 December, 
the second day of the offensive, that German forces had broken the line and 
they were to be moved out immediately but little else was known (Cole, 
1965). Just two days following the 101st’s arrival in Bastogne they were 
completely encircled by German forces but had set up a strong defense. The 
Division had little medical supplies, little food, no proper winter clothing, 
and as the Division Commander, Major General Taylor, was not with the 
Division, no higher-level military leadership. 
While the utilisation of experienced Allied combat soldiers was a 
tactical move due to their experience and recognised combat ability, the 
German Army was statistically undertrained across the board (Dupuy, et al., 
1994). Sixth Panzer Army commander, Josef Dietrich, describes the 1944 
state of training of his troops as ‘medium’ as 60% of the combat elements 
had less than six to eight weeks training (Parker, 1997, p. 16). He adds that 
replacements were from other non-army elements or young and old men 
new to the army (MacDonald, 1984, p. 37). This is consistent with the Fifth 
Panzer Army who relied on the 26th Volksgrenadier Division to form the 
first attack. These Volksgrenadier divisions were formed in 1944 
specifically for this offensive and primarily consisted of those that had 
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previously been exempt from conscription due to age, disability or home-
front purposes. Cirillo (2003, p. 19) and Cole (1965, p. 9) agree with this 
assessment, stating that Hitler’s obsession with numbers was to 
overcompensate for the lack of training. Employing the 26th Volksgrenadier 
division as the first attacking division was a tactical move as infantry is 
considered by most military theorists, including Clausewitz (1993), to be 
most effective in the first stages due the ability to move quickly and quietly, 
unlike panzer armies. Von Manteuffel’s utilisation of the 26th 
Volksgrenadier division was effective in terms of tactics relating to physical 
forces, such as superiority of numbers. This is evident by their ability to 
make an opening against the U.S. 28th division, allowing the two panzer 
divisions to move past and race for the Meuse River which made good 
progress in the initial days (Lone Sentry, 1945; Shapiro, 1976, p. 142). 
However, following the movement of the 101st Airborne Division to the 
area the moral forces became a greater influence on the offensive due to the 
sources of courage. The newly formed German 26th Volksgrenadier 
Division did not have the habitual courage resulting from experience 
(Kleemeier, 2007, p. 115) and whilst patriotic, most soldiers involved in the 
offensive did not understand the move to the west at all. Stephen E. 
Ambrose (2002) explains the situation: 
For the Germans, their physical misery was exacerbated by the 
terrible thought that what they were doing was the absolute 
worst thing they could do for their country and the German 
people. As Lt. Walter Rahn of the 11th Panzer Division put it, 
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‘Why were we holding up the Americans in the west and 
allowing the Russians to penetrate Germany? It was senseless 
what we were doing there, fighting the Americans.’ (p. 383) 
Regardless of the troop’s patriotism, the average soldier’s inability to 
understand the move to the west undoubtedly would have affected both 
courage and morale. This is supported by Lieutenant Colonel John W. 
Appel and Captain Gilbert W. Beene’s research on the psychological effects 
of combat in “Preventative Psychiatry: An Epidemiologic Approach” who 
assert that “group morale was improved when soldiers were given clear 
reasons for the importance of engaging in specific combat operations” (cited 
in Wanke, 1999, pp. 133-134). Without understanding the move to the west, 
German soldiers were unable to keep the morale high, particularly as the 
defense strengthened. 
From 21st December to 26th December the 101st Airborne Division, 
along with elements of the 10th Armoured Division, the 705th Tank 
Destroyer Battalion and 755th Armoured Field Artillery, were completely 
surrounded in what is now known as the Siege of Bastogne. During this 
period, the moral forces played an important part in delaying German 
attacks. It is evident that there was a large physical disadvantage to Allied 
forces as they totalled approximately 11,000 men (Ethier, 2009; Murphy, 
2014) against the 45,000 men of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, 2d 
Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr Division (Shapiro, 1976, p. 142). Not only 
were the physical forces inferior, the Allies were contending with a 
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multitude of frictional elements. The German divisions were charged with 
breaking through the Allied line and exploiting this friction. Due to the 
winter weather conditions (a frictional element) the Allies were unable to be 
resupplied by air meaning they had only the little supplies they entered 
Bastogne with. 
However, as evident in the literature they understood the mental ability 
needed to not only survive the action, but to take well thought-out bold, 
courageous actions for the benefit of themselves and their fellow soldiers 
(Ambrose, 2001; 2002). They had trust in one another formed from 
experiencing some of the most difficult situations imaginable. It is also 
important to note that the Airborne Divisions were paratroopers, and thus 
used to being surrounded (Marshall, 1988, p. 135). It is evident that the 
troops in the Ardennes from the 21st to the 26th December 1944 relied on 
moral forces until the physical forces were able to be increased. One man of 
the 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne contributes the 
trust gained from long periods of combat for the ability to utilise courage to 
persist in the face of danger during the offensive: 
We weren’t particularly elated at being here. Rumours are the 
Krauts are everywhere and hitting hard. Farthest from your mind 
is the thought of falling back. In fact it isn’t there at all. And so 
you dig your hole carefully and deep, and wait, for that mythical 
superman, but for the enemy you had beaten twice before and 
will again. You look first to the left, then right, at your buddies 
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also preparing. You feel confident with Bill over there. You 
know you can depend on him. (Ambrose, 2001, p. 178) 
There are three points of interest in this quote. The first, the use of the 
words, “you know you can depend”, demonstrating that the relationships 
built in combat were essential to positive morale. The utilisation of veteran 
soldiers by the United States in the Ardennes Offensive was a strategic 
move that, the literature suggests, assisted in German defeat and the failing 
of the Ardennes Offensive (Cole, 1965; Dupuy, et al., 1994). The second 
point: the soldier’s words, “farthest from your mind is the thought of falling 
back”; demonstrating the courage was a result of habit. Finally, the rumours 
that circulated; rumours are the perfect example of friction at work during 
the offensive. Clausewitz states that friction always has an effect on moral 
forces; however moral forces also combat friction. Friction in the Ardennes 
Offensive was almost all against the Allied forces; however their moral 
forces were able to prevent friction from greatly affecting their ability for 
successful action. 
 Various events within the six day siege had a positive effect on the 
courage and morale of Allied troops. Firstly, on December 22nd, a small 
number of German troops entered Bastogne demanding the Allies to 
surrender. The 101st Division’s commanding officer reply of “Nuts!” 
became famous across the entire front (Cole, 1965; Ethier, 2009). The 
absolute refusal for withdrawal by the commanding officer in the area 
increased morale as it became clear that those in high command had belief 
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in Allied success. Secondly, on December 23rd, the weather that the 
Germans were so dependent on to deny Allied forces use of their air support 
cleared allowing U.S. air men to drop essential supplies to attack German 
tanks and infantry from the air (Marshall, 1988; Murphy, 2014). While the 
supplies were still not adequate for the circumstances, and the weather 
quickly turned against the Allies once again, it greatly increased morale 
among the troops. 
 On December 26th, 1944, the siege was broken when elements of 
General Patton’s Third Army fought their way through the Fifth Panzer 
Army’s encirclement (Ethier, 2009). The addition of the Third Army in the 
area decreased the German superiority in physical forces which was 
followed by an Allied counteroffensive, pushing German forces back behind 
the Siegfried Line. However, during the six day siege the Allies relied on 
their moral forces to defend the area until the physical forces were able to 
equal the German Army’s, this was also the case in many other situations 
during the offensive. 
The effect of moral forces on the offensive overall is evident by the fact 
that the Fifth Panzer Army’s advance was by far the most successful of the 
three main armies involved, even though their advance was slight (Cole, 
1965, p. 135). An initial four U.S divisions against the Germans thirteen 
infantry divisions, seven panzer divisions, and two panzer brigades 
demonstrates that moral forces across the entire front were strong enough to 
form a successful defense until their physical forces could be increased. The 
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Sixth Panzer Army were stopped before the Our River (MacDonald, 1984, 
p. 588) and the Seventh Army achieved only slight penetrations, with most 
divisions failing to break through the initial defense (Cirillo, 2003, p. 18). 
The speed of troop movement in the initial stage of the offensive is evidence 
of the high morale amongst German troops, however as soon as Allied 
defense thwarted any significant progress moral forces decreased which is 
also evident by the lack of objectives seized (Parker, 1997, p. 79). Each day 
the Germans fell behind their timetable, their morale and courage decreased. 
However, it was not until January 22, 1945 that Hitler allowed complete 
withdrawal from the Ardennes with the conclusion of the offensive on 
January 25 (MacDonald, 1993, p. 26). According to Clausewitz (1993), the 
loss of what little ground the Germans gained during the five week period 
demonstrates the loss of morale (p. 273). While the courage and morale of 
the German and Allied armies was crucial to the outcome, the last element 
of moral forces, military leadership, will require further examination due to 
its effect on all aspects of the offensive. 
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Chapter Five 
Military Leadership in the Ardennes 
 
Chapter Three and Chapter Four have explored the utilisation and 
effects of physical and moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive. However, 
one aspect of moral forces has been separated from its counterparts for a 
stronger analysis – military leadership. In his 1832 text, On War, Carl von 
Clausewitz (1993) informs the reader on the concept of moral forces of 
which the first and most important element is military leadership. The 
military leaders chosen for discussion of this form of moral force either, 
demonstrate the characteristics outlined by Clausewitz, thus aligning with 
his theory on military genius, or oppose the characteristics but remain in a 
position of power within their country’s armed forces. Either way, military 
leaders have a great effect on their own, and their adversaries, utilisation 
and effects of physical and moral forces.  
In the chaos and danger that characterises war it is often the mind of 
one man that is forced to put the situation and its elements into perspective. 
Although all soldiers are forced into such circumstances, and those of lower 
ranks often in more danger due to their proximity to the front, it is a 
commander’s responsibility to make the critically important decisions in 
times of danger. Accordingly, military action must be supported by the 
appropriate military leadership. According to Clausewitz (1993), a military 
commander must have certain characteristics: a skilled judgement, sense of 
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intuition (and the ability to follow this intuition), courage, and determination 
are but some of the characteristics that compose a skilled commander. It is 
the combination of these characteristics that constitute the paradigmatic 
commander. An outstanding form of military leadership is more rare. Ulrike 
Kleemeier in his text, Moral Forces in War (2007), elucidates on this 
concept. As mentioned, the combination of the characteristics of the ideal 
commander is necessary. These characteristics are listed under the terms 
‘rational’ and/or ‘emotional’ (p. 110). It is the harmony of the rational and 
emotional aspect of man’s personality that when revealed - in this case in 
warfare - in extraordinary circumstances and successes that the military 
leader is termed a ‘military genius’ (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 115; Kleemeier, 
2007, p. 111). 
To begin, Dupuy et al. (1994, p. 369) makes an important point 
regarding the convoluted structure of the German High Command. This 
must be noted as Adolf Hitler, as Führer of Germany and its occupied 
territories, was in theory the equal of American president, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, and should require no discussion in regards to the Ardennes 
Offensive. However, Hitler had direct control over both the planning and 
execution of the offensive and therefore will be referred to as the equal, in a 
military capacity, to the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied 
Expeditionary Force, Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
As outlined in Clausewitz’s moral forces theory, the ability for great 
actions results from the relationship between reason and passion 
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(Kleemeier, 2007). This relationship is linked by will power which has both 
rational and emotional characteristics and, as such, the harmony of both may 
produce extraordinary feats (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 115). While Hitler’s goal 
for the Third Reich could be considered a passion (a ‘long-term emotion’), 
his sudden want for Antwerp was not, as it was an impulsive decision that 
was merely a pathway to the ultimate objective (Kleemeier, 2007, pp. 112, 
113). As “passions can combine with reason in a way spontaneous feelings 
cannot”, Hitler was unable to utilise the aptitude of will power (intellect) in 
guiding the spontaneous want for Antwerp (p. 112). It was Hitler’s passion 
that determined his longing for honour and renown – regarded by 
Clausewitz as the most powerful of all passions – which he believed the 
success of the offensive would result, as it would be a step closer to 
Germany’s rise (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 121). However, it was his lack of 
reason or rational thinking that determined the route. The literature on the 
Ardennes agrees that the failure in the initial planning stages of the 
offensive was a factor that largely contributed to its downfall (Cole, 1965). 
The decision to place Antwerp (a port north of the Ardennes) as the 
objective was entirely Hitler’s decision – and one with many opponents  It 
was not rational to base a plan on the success of a previous offensive (the 
1940 invasion of France), considering the Allies were now fully aware of 
German tactics in terms of Blitzkrieg, the United States Army situated in the 
Ardennes was of much higher calibre than the French Army in 1940, and 
the winter weather conditions being almost completely opposite of those of 
the 1940 offensive (Cirillo, 2003). However, as Hitler’s mind was clearly 
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unbalanced in terms of rational and emotional harmony, with emotion being 
the dominant element, the result was failure. His insistence on having total 
control over the German armed forces resulted in the ineffective utilisation 
of military leadership in its highest capacity. 
Hitler made the momentous decision to launch a major offensive during 
one of his daily morning meetings in September 1944 with his military 
advisors, General Jodl and General Keitel in attendance (Toland, 1999). 
Three Armies would be involved, two of those being SS Armies; the Sixth 
Panzer Army led by General Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich, the Fifth Panzer Army 
led by General Hasson von Manteuffel and the Fifteenth Army led by 
General Erich Brandenberger (Cole, 1965). Both Jodl and Keitel produced 
several alternate plans to the Führer as after analysing the logistical situation 
both Generals were well aware of its failings, only some of which included 
Germany’s failing situation in the East requiring the bulk of material and 
manpower, the lack of fuel and ammunition available, and the need to rely 
on aspects that were unreliable such as the slow reaction from Allied 
leadership to the offensive (Forty, 2002, p. 42-43). All plans were rejected. 
The literature supports the view that the utilisation of Clausewitz’s concept 
of judgment in Hitler’s examination of the alternative options was almost 
non-existent (Cole, 1965; Forty, 2000; MacDonald, 1984). The planning 
stage of the execution was not supported by the intellect needed to provide 
structure to Hitler’s impulsive emotions; thus once again there was a 
dominant emotional element, without the rational to provide support.  
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Danny S. Parker’s text, Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The German View 
of the Battle of the Bulge (1997), provides an invaluable source to support 
this assessment of Hitler’s lack of logical judgment. Parker has compiled the 
most important collection of interviews and essays comprising all of the key 
members of the German command, excluding Hitler. These interviews and 
essays were conducted just months following the conclusion of World War 
II as a program initiated by the European Theater of Operations (ETO) 
Historical Section. Each interview was conducted separately and all three 
Army Generals, Dietrich, von Manteuffel and Brandenberger criticise 
Hitler’s military advisors for supporting Hitler’s delusions. General von 
Manteuffel of the Fifth Panzer Army remarks on Jodl’s lack of experience 
in war (Parker, 1997, p. 232); his opinion on Keitel was just as bad. The 
books editor, Parker (1997), agrees with von Manteuffel’s assessment of 
Keitel stating, “What Hitler saw in Keitel was an unthinking assistant who 
would blindly obey his bidding…” His lack of “imagination or intellectual 
power…” was evident (p. 232). General Dietrich of the Sixth Panzer Army 
which was tasked with the main thrust through the Ardennes adds, “They 
[Jodl and Keitel] only waged war…on maps” (p. 234). The utilisation of 
military leadership in this regard was another flawed element that had 
devastating effects. It is evident that Hitler abused his military leadership 
position to surround himself by those who would provide advice but 
ultimately submit to his judgments. 
It was not until just days before the December 16 offensive was set to 
begin that all of the Generals who were to be involved became privy to the 
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plan. Consequently, Hitler’s method of military leadership had a run-on 
effect that affected the Generals who were to lead the offensive. His 
paranoia in keeping the details of the offensive a secret prevented his Army 
Generals from having the appropriate time to plan or counsel their division 
commanders as General Dietrich of the Sixth Panzer Army declares, “I 
should have been given four weeks of planning instead of four days. I was 
not in the area even once before the attack, and I couldn’t look at the terrain. 
I didn’t have time to prepare my thoughts and ideas in the way they really 
should have been prepared” (cited in Parker, 1997, p. 28). He bravely 
admitted his doubts directly to Hitler following the meeting, “I told Hitler 
that I wasn’t ready to attack with my Army and that we didn’t have the 
ammunition or fuel to carry it through successfully. The generals were all in 
a line waiting to speak to Hitler and I had only a minute to tell him…He 
said that I would have all I needed” (cited in Parker, 1997, p. 18). Parker 
(1997) states that by 1944 German military leadership was “merely a 
mechanical commanding body” (p. 147), suggesting that they were just 
puppets without any ability for individual thought and action. The army 
commanders, Dietrich, von Manteuffel and Brandenberger were to rely on 
the decisions made by inexperienced men who far from understood the 
actual situation at the front. Their efforts in altering the plan were rejected; 
it appeared they had the individual thoughts and judgement but were not 
expected to actually display this. A statement by Dietrich expressing his 
disdain for the final plan supports this assessment, “This winter offensive, in 
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my opinion, was the worst prepared German offensive of this war” (cited in 
Parker, 1997, p. 30). 
Hitler’s strict control over the offensive left the Commander in Chief 
West, General Gerd von Rundstedt in an odd position. Technically, von 
Rundstedt should have been the man to control the offensive, yet he had 
little involvement choosing to allow Army Group B commander, General 
Model the little control that Hitler offered (Hart, 1983, p. 444). Cole (1965) 
emphasises the lack of control given, stating, “Instructions issued by Hitler 
for the conduct of operations were in such detail that field commanders of 
the stature of [von] Rundstedt and Model lacked the authority to move units 
as small as divisions” (p. 31). The question can then be asked as to what 
Hitler’s reasoning was for von Rundstedt’s employment. A study of the 
literature revealed several interesting points of explanation.  Von Rundstedt 
had only recently, as of September 1944, been recalled to his position, 
previously being dismissed according to MacDonald (1984) for minor 
suggests of withdrawal (p. 21). Zabecki (1999) states that von Rundstedt 
was well-respected by the Allies (p. 481). He was therefore to be the 
‘figurehead’ which was ultimately a tactic to persuade the Allies that the 
war in Europe onwards would be based on appropriate military strategies 
which was effective as it contributed to the Allies surprise of the December 
16 breakthrough (MacDonald, 1984, p. 34). 
The Ardennes Offensive began on December 16, 1944 with an hour 
long bombardment of infantry along the one hundred kilometre front. Chaos 
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and fear quickly spread through Allied lines and according to highly 
regarded historian Stephen Ambrose (2002), a “breakdown of discipline” 
ensued (p. 204). It was here that the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Forces, General Eisenhower was responsible for “…the critical decisions of 
the entire battle…” by his immediate direction of the 82d and 101st 
Airborne Divisions to move into the Ardennes (Ambrose, 2001, p. 174). 
Both divisions were refitting following the failure of Operation Market 
Garden (Cole, 1965). The use of these divisions – the strategic reserves for 
the entire Northwest – was not a decision to make lightly. Yet, 
Eisenhower’s determination, another element of military genius, ensured not 
only the divisions, but vehicles and material immediately began the move to 
the Ardennes. Hitler’s assumption that Eisenhower would take several days 
to even understand the offensive was one of major proportions was 
immediately thwarted as Eisenhower’s skill as a military leader became 
evident. Historians, Dupuy et al. (1994), Forty (2000), and MacDonald 
(1984) agree that Eisenhower’s reaction to the breakthrough was critical to 
Allied success. This factor was also mentioned in almost all interviews 
conducted by Parker (1997). The effect of this was the saving of thousands 
of lives and potentially prevented German forces from gaining back ground 
and lengthening the war. 
Eisenhower’s decision relates to Clausewitz’s use of judgment and 
intuition titled coup d’oeil. Kleemeier (2007) describes it as “truth [being] 
felt rather than deduced” (p. 113). The critical decision was a result of 
Eisenhower’s ability to realise the importance of the December 16 
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breakthrough with no military intelligence to support this feeling (Parker, 
1997, p. 141). No other decision during the Ardennes Offensive displays the 
utilisation of this characteristic to such a great extent. It is a textbook 
example of intuition leading military action as “action can never be based 
on anything firmer than instinct, a sensing of the truth” (Clausewitz, 1993, 
p. 125). Considering the lack of military intelligence, aerial reconnaissance, 
and little organised front-line reports to support this intuitive feeling, his 
boldness in taking action is a considerable feat and one in which 
undoubtedly effected the rest of the offensive as it denied the Germans the 
time, and the frictions, they were relying upon to make a major 
breakthrough, and greatly affected their timetable. 
Once Eisenhower had given general strategies for the defense against 
German Forces, it was up to the army group commanders to initiate these 
orders. In Chapter Three, the discussion centred on the utilisation and 
effects of physical forces. It was concluded that a key effect was General 
Montgomery being given temporary command of all Allied forces north of 
Bastogne on December 20, the fourth day of the offensive (Eisenhower, p. 
355; MacDonald, 1993, p. 4). Eisenhower in his memoir, Crusade in 
Europe (1997), stresses the positive effect of Montgomery’s command on 
the northern area as control and communication between armies was able to 
stay open which would have been difficult without this changeover as 
General Bradley was situated in his headquarters south of the Ardennes and 
unable to make contact with two of his armies whilst simultaneously 
executing a counterattack from the south (Cirillo, 2003, p. 29; Eisenhower, 
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1997, pp. 355-356; Smith, 2014). However, the analysis suggests that 
Eisenhower’s employment of Montgomery as sole ground commander was 
to ensure the Allied military system and public, as well as the German high 
command recognized that Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Force (SHAEF) was committed to the Allied coalition (Morelock, 1994; 
Smith, 2014). 
While, Montgomery may have calmed the situation, the effect of the 
changeover on the planned counterattack was disastrous. The literature 
largely agrees that Montgomery’s ambition was to obtain command of allied 
forces and lead the final drive into the political heart of Germany - Berlin. 
This goal was partly to end the war under British command – almost in 
opposition to Eisenhower’s staunch coalition based war. Once command 
was achieved, Montgomery became over-cautious; we may assume as a 
result of not wanting to make errors and either lose command or the public’s 
perception. Following the breakthrough, SHAEF immediately began 
planning for a counteroffensive to push German forces back behind the 
West Wall or as the Germans titled it, the Siegfried Line. Montgomery’s 
lack of boldness and bad judgment – unwanted characteristics in a 
commander – prevented him from initiating his part of the counteroffensive 
in a timely manner. Clausewitz’s (1993) statement that “boldness grows less 
common in the higher ranks as [commanders] become governed by intellect 
but must obey orders” (p. 221, 224) was accurate in Montgomery’s case. He 
lacked the boldness required for such a role; however, interestingly he went 
against the orders from his superior. Morelock (1994) outlines his 
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explanations for the delay, ranging from Germany having reserves the Allies 
were unaware of to Allied troops being too shocked to effectively form a 
counteroffensive (p. 67). Consequently, whilst General Patton initiated the 
Third Army’s part of the counteroffensive on December 23rd, Montgomery 
delayed his First Army’s role until January 3rd (Ambrose, 1990). The issue 
was that by the time the attack had progressed Hitler had slowly succumbed 
to von Manteuffel’s insistence on withdrawal which affected the Allies 
efforts to destroy as many German troops and equipment as possible  
(MacDonald, 1993, p. 26). 
Montgomery’s ambition, or passion, had overridden any reason. 
Morelock (1994) states: 
Monty was so preoccupied with gaining approval of his single 
thrust offensive in the north (and receiving overall command of 
Allied ground forces) that he treated the Ardennes 
counteroffensive as a sideshow, to be finished with the least 
possible effort and expenditure of resources, thereby not 
detracting from his real priority – the final campaign into 
Germany. (p. 74) 
This affected not only the counteroffensive itself, but the eventual drive into 
Germany. The main reason for the counteroffensive to be initiated swiftly 
was to destroy as many German forces as possible that would be used in the 
defense of the Reich (Eisenhower, p. 363). If Montgomery had initiated his 
part earlier and pushed south to link with Patton’s Third Army the war may 
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have ended long before it actually did. The destructive effects of 
Montgomery’s control was evident when following the linkup of the two 
armies on January 16, the following day the First Army was returned to 
Bradley’s control (Morelock, p. 127). Montgomery’s lack of boldness, bad 
judgement and his determination for British fame resulted in him fabricating 
the truth to the public and press of his influence (Ambrose, 1990, p. 180; 
Brighton, 2008; Zaloga, 2010) yet the analyses conclusion is clear: 
Montgomery’s leadership had a negative effect on the Allied role in the 
Ardennes Offensive. 
Thus far the analysis of military leadership in the Ardennes 
Offensive has been varied as to the success of decisions, actions and overall 
command. However, as we turn to army level we can see a definitive 
increase in successful decisions made purely by the commander’s military 
understanding and psychological strength. With varying degrees of training, 
development and experiences in war, we can only conclude that in this 
instance Clausewitz’s (1993) notion that the further one goes down in 
command, the more boldness and individualism increase is accurate (p. 
221). This is particularly true when analysing Lieutenant General George S. 
Patton’s influence on the offensive. As commander of the United States 
Third Army, Patton was well renowned within the military and on the home 
front which the literature suggests was a large motivation for him 
(Blumenson, 1985, p. 223). As stated earlier, Clausewitz describes renown 
and honour as the most powerful of all passions, providing “the ambition to 
strive higher than the rest, as he must if he is to distinguish himself” (p. 121-
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122). It was this ambition that produced Patton’s great actions that had 
direct effects on Allied success in the Ardennes. 
The employment of Patton as Third Army commander had a positive 
effect on the outcome of the Ardennes Offensive for Allied Forces. Whilst 
the literature agrees that the December 16 breakthrough was a complete 
surprise to SHAEF, various historians (Dupuy et al., p. 11; MacDonald, 
1984, p. 75; Morelock, p. 203) including Patton scholar, Martin Blumenson, 
who dedicated much of his academic career studying the army commander 
and produced such texts as, Patton, the Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945 
(1985), states that Patton was concerned about the lightly defended 
Ardennes long before the attack began as evident in his diary which directly 
relates to Clausewitz’s idea of intuitively based action. His intuitive thought 
alone was not remarkable; his actions based upon his intuition were. 
Clausewitz (1993) states that “war is the realm of uncertainty…” (p. 117) 
which requires one to have two qualities coup d’oeil defined as intuition and 
judgement, and determination, the ability to take action on the intuitive 
thought (p. 117). Patton perceiving the Ardennes as a potential opportunity 
for the enemy demonstrates Clausewitz’s first quality. The truly remarkable 
aspect lies in his actions in combatting this concern. Firstly, early in 
December Patton advised his staff to begin developing plans in case of a 
breakthrough as the Ardennes was situated on his Army’s north flank. 
Secondly, following the breakthrough he began moving numerous divisions, 
consisting of thousands of troops into a northward facing position in the 
event he receive an order to counterattack (Patton & Harkins, 1995). It must 
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be mentioned that the Allies were preparing for their own offensive to begin 
on December 19, 1944. As such, Patton’s determination in following his 
intuition is even more impressive. The effect of Patton’s intuition and 
correct judgement can be seen in his next action. 
Following the December 16 breakthrough SHAEF staff held a 
meeting at Verdun to discuss how to counterattack, which was also attended 
by army group and army level Generals (Patton & Harkins, 1995). It was 
here that, once again, Patton demonstrated his skilled leadership. Among the 
various issues since the breakthrough, the town of Bastogne had been under 
siege with the 101st Airborne Division and elements of the 10th Armoured 
Division in its centre. Patton’s response to the situation was to inform those 
in attendance that on December 23 three of his divisions could begin 
moving north towards Bastogne with three divisions to follow later 
(Blumenson, 1985, p. 246, 247; Patton & Harkins, 1995, p. 330). Historians 
such as Ambrose (2002), Blumenson (1985), and Dupuy et al. (1994) all 
describe Eisenhower’s shock and uncertainty at the possibility of such an 
action, even though interestingly Eisenhower (1997) does not comment on 
this in his own memoir. Third Army movement went ahead towards 
Bastogne and on December 26, just three days following the first stage of 
movement, the siege was broken with Morelock (1994) describing the 
action as “masterfully executed” (p. 130). Additional evidence to Patton’s 
skill as an army commander lies in a point Morelock makes that 12th Army 
Group commander General Bradley, Patton’s superior, should have been the 
one to plan and command this action (p. 130). The fact that these divisions 
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had moved so quickly over one hundred miles not only demonstrates 
Patton’s leadership skills, it also demonstrates the high rate of morale as 
they were able to overcome the obstacles that delayed the German Army in 
their own advance (Kirkpatrick, 1992). The Allies, in their initial defense 
then relief of Bastogne, had successfully prevented German forces from 
achieving a crucial military objective which slowed the German drive to 
Antwerp and contributed to General von Manteuffel’s assessment that the 
German offensive could no longer reach the objective (Cirillo, 2003, p. 26; 
Cole, 1965; MacDonald, 1993, p. 23). 
The utilisation of General Patton’s skilled leadership successfully 
relieved Bastogne. Whilst Stephen Ambrose, in his 2001 book, Band of 
Brothers, which follows the United States Easy Company of the 506th 
Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division who were involved in the siege 
of Bastogne, states that none involved have ever admitted they needed “to 
be rescued” (p. 191) it is not certain as to what may have transpired if 
Patton’s Army had not broken the siege. A study of the literature and the 
major events, decisions and actions that transpired over the five week period 
concludes that Patton’s leadership displayed the most characteristics 
outlined by Clausewitz for the ideal military leader amongst Allied generals 
as he demonstrated intuition, judgement, boldness and determination that 
greatly affected the Ardennes Offensive by contributing to the staunch 
defense at Bastogne and the counteroffensive. This was not the conclusion 
from one action but from multiple that often occurred consecutively. 
Although the other generals did display these characteristics, they were 
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often displayed in isolated incidents and did not encompass the combination 
of Clausewitz’s characteristics. 
Fifth Panzer Army commander, General von Manteuffel was one of the 
opposite army commanders to Patton, but the only one who was an equal in 
terms of skill. From the planning stages of the offensive, von Manteuffel 
demonstrated professional ability. Hitler trusted this ability which resulted 
in von Manteuffel convincing Hitler to alter various aspects of the plan; the 
first being to begin the attack with infantry followed by a broad front panzer 
attack, and to begin at 5:30am to take advantage of the daylight (Cole, 1965, 
p. 173; Goolrick & Tanner, 1979, p. 86; Mellenthin, 1977, p. 243). Whilst 
not managing to make major changes, these tactical changes were an 
improvement. However, it was during the execution of the offensive that 
von Manteuffel’s skill, particularly his boldness, was unmistakeable. Whilst 
Dietrich and Brandenberger were quickly halted by U.S. defense, von 
Manteuffel managed to quickly breakthrough the Allied line, in part because 
he had covertly altered the Fifth Panzer Army’s plan according to the terrain 
as he sent forth assault detachments to begin the attack (Mellenthin, 1977, p. 
244). 
Following the staunch U.S. defense at Bastogne, von Manteuffel made 
the decision to instead focus his panzer divisions on reaching the Meuse 
River as U.S. defenders would still be under siege from his infantry 
divisions until Patton’s Army could make contact from the south (Cirillo, 
2003, p. 26). His boldness in doing so appears to go against Clausewitz’s 
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(1993) idea of obedience, as the theorist states “only when boldness rebels 
against obedience, when it defiantly ignores an express command, must it be 
treated as a dangerous offensive…” (p. 224). At first glance, Clausewitz’s 
statement seems quite contradictory within the whole, however we must 
remember that his idea of obedience stems from the standpoint that in 
theory the superior will allow for independent thought on all levels. The 
commander must be given a broad plan which allows for individual decision 
making to counter frictional elements that are unforeseeable (Kleemeier, 
2007, p. 116-117). So, we could state that von Manteuffel’s deviation from 
his orders was merely adapting to actual conditions and elements. These 
deviations resulted in greater success as the Fifth Panzer Army became the 
main attacking army with elements getting close to the preliminary 
objective of reaching the Meuse River in comparison to Dietrich and 
Brandenberger who strictly obeyed their orders and did not manage to 
advance against the initial U.S defense (Cirillo, 2003, p. 18). Once Patton’s 
Army was involved, it became clear to von Manteuffel that withdrawal was 
the only option. After many failed attempts, he managed to convince Hitler 
and saved thousands of troops, equipment and materiel from destruction 
which was then able to be used in the final defense of the Reich. Mellenthin 
(1977) agrees that von Manteuffel’s performance was the greatest of the 
German generals in the field which we can attribute to his display of good 
judgement, boldness, and determination which Dupuy et al. (1994) goes so 
far as to state that he “seems to have had at least a touch of genius…” (p. 
369-370). Regardless of his total disbelief in the offensive, he did 
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everything in his power to achieve success. The utilisation of von 
Manteuffel as an army commander was Hitler’s greatest achievement in the 
Ardennes Offensive. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the German commanders did not 
effectively utilise their positions as military leaders due to their inability to 
employ their own initiative and judgement. The effect was disastrous; they 
were unable to make even the most minor decisions without permission 
from Hitler himself, wasting precious time for Allied leaders to utilise their 
skill, regroup, and make effective decisions that quickly turned the offensive 
in their favour. Military leadership as under Clausewitz’s concept of moral 
forces titled ‘skill of the commander’ had the largest impact on determining 
the outcome of the Ardennes Offensive as it effected the utilisation of both 
physical and the remaining moral forces. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis provided a re-interpretation of World War II’s 1944-1945 
Ardennes Offensive by utilising the theoretical perspective of Carl von 
Clausewitz according to his military text On War, published in 1832. This 
perspective aimed to provide an explanation as to why such an initial 
physical superiority failed to produce success for German forces. 
Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces was chosen as it has not previously 
been applied to the offensive, as the majority of the literature on the 
offensive simply provide an examination of the physical forces, thus, this 
thesis provides a different re-interpretation of the final result. By taking the 
Clausewitzian terms and concepts of physical and moral forces and placing 
them in the context of a twentieth century period of military and political 
action this thesis reveals the importance of moral forces in warfare. This 
thesis aimed to answer three research questions: 
1. Using Clausewitzian theory, what does an analysis of World 
War II’s 1944 Ardennes Offensive reveal about the utilisation 
and effects of physical and moral forces? 
2. To what degree was the Ardennes Offensive determined through 
physical or moral forces? 
3. What were the main events, operations or situations that 
effected moral forces? 
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To do so, this thesis was broken down into three topics: physical forces, 
moral forces, and military leadership. 
The analysis reveals that the German Forces effectively utilised their 
physical forces by employing Clausewitz’s concept of the maximum use of 
force through speed and surprise, however, the strategy (a result of 
ineffective military leadership) did not accurately account for the lack of 
fuel and influence of terrain on such a large number of forces. This resulted 
in clogged roads which prevented a swift attack. Allied Forces were then 
able to regroup, reorganise and move forces to the Ardennes and set up a 
staunch defense. The initial physical superiority garnered slow results, 
nowhere near the level expected. It is clear that physical forces were not 
effectively utilised due to ineffective planning, thus the planning stages of 
the offensive were crucial to its failure. 
The utilisation of moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive was most 
evident during the Siege of Bastogne from December 21 to December 26. 
During this operation the Allies managed to utilise their moral forces to 
produce a staunch defense which prevented German Forces from moving 
towards the port of Antwerp to assist in its capture.  The analysis revealed 
that both Allied and German Armies had replacements and new divisions, 
however the German Army employed many Volksgrenadier Divisions in 
main roles. While this was effective in terms of physical superiority, as soon 
as the physical superiority was reduced the moral forces of the adversaries 
became a large contributor to the effective utilisation of physical forces. The 
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utilisation of moral forces, particularly courage, was a result of different 
sources of courage. Allied military leaders ensured the United States 82d 
and 101st Airborne Division were quickly relocated to the Ardennes. This 
was a strategic move, not only as they were the reserves available for 
Northwest Europe, but also because they had the ability to produce large 
amounts of courage and positive morale due to their experience, training 
and patriotism. The new German divisions were ineffectively utilised in the 
endeavour to capture Bastogne, as their courage was formed purely from 
patriotism, threats, and fear. Consequently, the United States veteran 
division in Bastogne were able to utilise their moral forces against the 
inexperienced German division until reinforcements arrived. 
The utilisation of military leadership in the Ardennes Offensive had the 
greatest effect on the result. This is evident from the initial planning stage 
through to execution. German Führer, Adolf Hitler’s, total control affected 
every aspect of the offensive, particularly his influence on his subordinates. 
The German military leaders were unable to utilise their judgement and 
intuition to secure a more realistic objective and strategies to achieve this. 
However, the Fifth Panzer Armies commander, General Hasso von 
Manteuffel demonstrated the most characteristics of Clausewitz’s concept of 
a skilled commander by utilising his intuition and judgement to alter his 
army’s route and tactics; interestingly his army made the most progress 
during the offensive. Allied Forces had a much more effective command 
structure, largely a result of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s commitment to the Allied coalition. 
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Eisenhower made numerous critical decisions during the offensive, the most 
important being his movement of the major reserves to the Ardennes 
following his intuitive though of the offensive being one of major 
proportions. However, the December 20 command change permitting 
British General, Bernard Montgomery command of all forces north of 
Bastogne resulted in a delayed counteroffensive, allowing thousands of 
German Forces to regroup for the final defense of the Third Reich. General 
George S. Patton’s role as commander of the United States Third Army was 
essential to success in the offensive. His skilled judgement and 
determination in relieving Bastogne and commitment to the Allied 
counteroffensive prevented German Forces from regrouping and altering 
their strategy. 
The analysis of the 1944 Ardennes Offensive through the perspective of 
Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces has provided an alternative explanation 
for Allied success in the Ardennes due to the interaction of physical and 
moral forces. The human element of warfare was chosen as the basis for the 
analysis of the Ardennes offensive as it is ignored by most military theorists, 
yet plays a large role in warfare. This thesis contributes to previous 
examinations of the offensive, and application of Clausewitz’s concept of 
moral forces. This theoretical perspective can also be applied to other 
historical battles to provide an additional layer for analysis and a deeper 
understanding of the psychological contribution to warfare. 
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